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BULGARIA, TURKEY AND THE USSR

By
HARRIET MOORE

Italo-Greek hostilities have shifted the focus of war to the Black Sea sector of Soviet diplomacy. Today only Bulgaria and Turkey stand between the fighting and the approaches to the rich Soviet South, bringing war closer to Soviet borders than in any other area. The thin land barrier of Bulgaria separates German troops in Rumania and their British rivals in Greece; only the short bottleneck of the Turkish-held Straits (the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosporus) keep the British blockade from stretching across Black Sea trade channels.

Whether some contingency may force one or the other of the chief protagonists to seek to break down these tenuous barriers in order to come to grips with its rival on a new battle front must obviously represent for the Soviets a source of major concern and it can be assumed that the weight of Soviet diplomacy is heavily on the side of keeping both Bulgaria and Turkey out of the war.

Tiny, over-populated Bulgaria and large, sparsely settled Turkey have little in common. Bulgaria, closely tied economically to Germany, was a serious gap in Britain's chain of guarantees for Rumania, Turkey and Greece, while Turkey, on the other hand, became virtually allied to England shortly after the outbreak of war. Yet a glance at the map will show how closely bound up are the fates of these two countries. The non-belligerency of Bulgaria, Germany's road to the Dardanelles, could hardly be expected to survive Turkish entrance into the war. And again, Turkey, holding Britain's key to Germany's eastern flank, would inevitably be heavily pressed to move its troops, already concentrated west of the Straits, were Bulgaria to be drawn into the conflict.

This article attempts to investigate some of the elements which enter into the complex of pressures operative on Bulgaria and Turkey, and to estimate in what degree the Soviets may exert their influence in the interests of their own continued non-involvement in the war.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1934 along with most of the other Balkan states,[1] as part of the general effort to build a solid front in east Europe against resurgent Germany. Relations did not lead to more friendly intercourse, nor was Bulgaria party to the general treaties defining aggression which had been initiated by the Soviets and to which most of Bulgaria's neighbors had adhered in 1933. In fact it was not until 1940 that anything like cordial relationships developed between the two countries. Considering the pre-1914 history of Bulgaria, it is perhaps curious that this should have been the case, as Bulgaria's independence and the short-lived "Greater Bulgaria" of 1878 were achieved with the aid of Russian arms. As a Slav state, it had long been under the tutelage of Tsarist Russia, an integral part of the Pan-Slav movement to disrupt the Ottoman Empire and to bar the southeastward expansion of the Hapsburgs.

In the chaotic years following the last war, Bulgaria became a haven for anti-Bolshevik refugees and as the Soviets dropped out of the struggle for Balkan dominance, the Bulgarian government found it easy to turn its back on the USSR. This was particularly the case after the coup d'etat of 1923 removed, by assassination, the Agrarian Party's Premier Stambolisky, and disbanded down to the present any popular parties among which the pro-Russian feeling may have persisted.[2]

At the same time, in the decade from 1923 to 1933, the tug-of-war in the Balkans lay between the status-quo, Francophile group of successor states and the revisionists who more or less followed the Italian lead. As one of the defeated states of the last World War, Bulgaria has been among the latter and consequently even the heyday of French influence directed toward the erection of an eastern

[1] Czechoslovakia—June 9, 1934; Rumania—June 9, 1934; Bulgaria—July 23, 1934; Albania—Sept. 17, 1934; Hungary—Feb. 4, 1934. (Yugoslavia did not establish relations until June 24, 1940.)

[2] In 1927 the Agrarian Party and the Labor Party took part in the elections and from 1931-1934 Agrarians were in the Government but not an important element. In 1933 the Labor-Communist Party was dissolved and by the Army coup of 1934 all political parties were declared illegal.

bloc, based finally on the Soviet and Czech mutual assistance pacts, did not serve to bring Bulgaria closer to the Soviets.

That in 1940 the Bulgarian government found reason to seek friendlier relations with the USSR arose from Bulgaria's isolation in the Balkans. As a revisionist state, with territorial pretensions against three of its neighbors—Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece,[3] it had remained aloof from both the Little Entente, established in 1921 between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and the Balkan Entente of 1934. While the former was directed primarily against Hungarian revisionism, it was obvious that the latter, composed of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey had Bulgaria's claims primarily in view. Though various efforts had been made during recent years to bring it into a treaty of mutual guarantee with its neighbors, Bulgaria was only willing to go as far as to sign at Salonika a non-aggression pact with the Balkan Entente (July 31, 1938). It would not renounce its claims nor guarantee the frontiers of the other signatories. In return for recognition of its right to arm, and the abrogation of the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne treaty, Bulgaria agreed to arbitrate disputes with its neighbors.

When at the close of 1939 war broke out in Europe, Bulgaria found itself surrounded by countries bound to one another by treaties of assistance and, further, bound to one of the belligerents. Turkey, Rumania and Greece were all guaranteed by England, though in fact Rumania was economically tied to Germany through the devices of the March 23, 1939, trade agreement.[4] Yugoslavia hung in the balance, a successor state earlier under French influence, now caught between Italian and German pressure. Under the circumstances, Bulgaria could not but look for some way to restore the balance of pressures in the Balkans. The first sign of any such re-orientation was in May, 1939, when the then Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs Potemkin stopped in Sofia on his way back from a visit to Turkey. Later that summer a large delegation of

[3] From Rumania—Southern Dobrudja; Yugoslavia—part of Macedonia; Greece—an outlet to the Aegean.

[4] This agreement made provision for adjusting Rumanian agricultural production to German needs and joint development of mining and industry.

members of the Bulgarian parliament visited the Soviet Union, nominally to attend the Agricultural Exposition, and the Bulgarian press began to carry more favorable comments on Soviet developments.

Following the outbreak of war, negotiations for a Soviet-Bulgarian commercial agreement were initiated; an airline from Sofia to Moscow was established, on which services were inaugurated in March, 1940, and regular shipping services were undertaken, linking Odessa and Varna. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed Jan. 5, 1940, has subsequently been supplemented by several trade agreements arranging for the exchange of specific goods.

In the diplomatic sphere, Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation has not been overt, but it was most clearly revealed in the return of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Taking advantage of the helplessness of Rumania in the face of German pressure and its isolation from its nominal allies, the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria all "revised" their frontiers at Rumania's expense.[5] For Bulgaria's claims to southern Dobrudja the Soviets accorded moral support on the grounds that historically the area belonged to Bulgaria, that, although its population was very mixed, the largest group was Bulgarian and, finally, that Rumania had followed a policy of oppression and "Rumanization" toward the other national groups.[6] That this support must also have been expressed beyond the pages of the Soviet press is implied in the official thanks extended to the Soviet Government by the Bulgarian Government.[7]

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BULGARIA

Bulgaria, which is about the size of Indiana (39,800 sq. mi.), like most of the other Balkan countries is overwhelmingly agricultural. Its population of 6.3 million is 80 per cent engaged in farming small, peasant landholdings. Only 16 per cent of these are over

[5] The Soviet Union repossessed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; Hungary took back Transylvania which had been awarded to Rumania following the World War; Bulgaria received southern Dobrudja which she had lost in the second Baltic War in 1913.

[6] *Pravda,* August 13, 1940.

[7] cf. *Pravda,* September 11, 1940.

37 acres.[8] These little farms, averaging 30 acres in size, are farmed under the primitive strip system, using simple wooden implements. Although the government has attempted land reform and more recently tried to foster the use of modern farm implements, the fact remains that because of the primitive nature of agricultural organization there is relative rural overpopulation and it is estimated that only 60 per cent of the labor supply can be used.

In addition to agricultural pursuits, there is a small amount of industry, over half of which is controlled by foreign capital.[9] Manufacture of food products and textiles take first place and there is a small exportable surplus from coal and copper mines. Nonetheless Bulgaria's economic life is absolutely dependent on its sales of agricultural produce in the foreign market. Tobacco has become the basic export, accounting for 41 per cent of the total farm exports in 1939, while grains amounted only to 7.4 per cent. These figures compare with 1 per cent for tobacco and 64.3 per cent for grain in 1911.[10] In this trade Germany has always been important but has been gaining rapidly over the last decade, as was the case in most other Balkan countries. In 1929 it took 29.9 per cent of the exports and provided 22.2 per cent of Bulgarian imports, while the corresponding figures for 1938 were 58.9 per cent and 52.0 per cent. This trade was carried out on the basis of clearing accounts, amounting in effect to barter. Furthermore the prices of goods exchanged in this way did not correspond to world prices, which according to an English study, was done at the expense of the German market, but perhaps with the object of associating "the economic systems of these countries so closely with her own as to make it difficult for them to sever their connection in time of war."[11] Until recently Bulgaria had refused to sell its wheat to Germany on a barter basis

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[8] The facts and figures in this paragraph are taken from *Foreign Agriculture*, Vol. IV, No. 12, December, 1940, published by U. S. Department of Agriculture.

[9] Distribution of Foreign Investments: Belgium, 27.5%; Switzerland, 23.3%; France, 11.4%; United States, 10.9%; Italy, 9.9%; Czechoslovakia, 5.5%; Germany, 5.2%; Austria, 2.7%; United Kingdom, 1.4%. Source: *South-Eastern Europe*, Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 174.

[10] *Foreign Agriculture, op. cit.*, p. 773.

[11] *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

because it wished to get free exchange, but in other respects Bulgaria's agriculture has been reoriented to meet German demand as in the increased planting of industrial crops.[11a]

PRESENT RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

For the Soviet Union and Bulgaria to expand their commercial interchange presents obvious difficulties as the USSR is not a large market for tobacco or agricultural produce generally. The trade agreement of early 1940 provides for Soviet exports of oil, metals, machinery and cotton goods for Bulgarian tobacco, hogs, rose-oil and hides. Diplomatically, the two countries have at present manifest interests in common. With repossession of Bessarabia, the Soviets joined Bulgaria as a Danube power. Since September, when the Soviets insisted on being a member of the new Danubian Commission,[12] there have been one or two preliminary meetings of the new "amalgamated commission,"[13] but no information has been made public as to the subjects under discussion. It is nonetheless self-evident that for both Bulgaria and the USSR the Danube is at present an especially important shipping route which should be kept out of the sphere of military activity if possible. In a general way both nations as Black Sea powers again have a common interest in maintaining the present regime of the straits. That Bulgaria is moving with care so as not to disturb Turkey's non-belligerency seems evident in the fact that it has not as yet taken advantage of the Italo-Greek war to pursue its revisionist aims vis-à-vis Greece.[14] Such caution accords with the Soviet desideratum of keeping the war from spreading further into the Balkans and Near East.

There are as yet few indications that Bulgaria and the USSR have done more than vitalize hitherto dormant diplomatic relations.

[11a] Berlin reports that it has contracted to purchase virtually the entire 1941 Bulgarian tobacco crop.—*New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1941.

[12] On Sept. 12, 1940, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that the Soviet Government had told the German Ambassador that it could not "remain indifferent" toward any arrangements that might be made in regulating Danube shipping.

[13] Including representatives of USSR, Germany, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Yugoslavia.

[14] Turkey has a mutual assistance pact with Greece, signed in 1933.

The Soviets have denied any knowledge of a German move into Bulgaria,[15] which is without doubt a veiled reminder to Germany of the Soviet-German agreement to consult each other on moves of mutual interest. The Bulgarian government for its part has to date maintained its claim to independence in foreign policy. In Premier Philoff's speech on his return from Vienna and, prior to that in the Parliamentary debates on foreign policy, Bulgaria has reiterated its revisionism, its neutrality, and its opposition to all the "isms." The present government is a continuation of a more or less non-party government with little or no popular representation[16] which has been in power since 1934.

Thus the now popular cliche that in Bulgaria the people are pro-Russian, the ministers pro-German and the Queen pro-Italian may be borne out in the present jockeying of Bulgaria. Because of the historical relationship between the Bulgars and the Russians, and recent improvements in the relations between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the USSR, there have been various rumors of a revival of Pan-Slavism under Soviet patronage. The Soviet official news agency TASS categorically denied this (May 10, 1940) and in summarizing a short historical survey of Pan-Slavism, a Soviet authority had this to say:

"In this way, the ideas of Russian Pan-Slavism from their first appearances have always been thoroughly reactionary. They served the interests of Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie in their policy of expansion into the Balkans and in their policy of russification in relation to the Ukrainians, Poles, Belorussian and other non-Russian peoples inhabiting 'the prison of peoples'—the Russian Empire.

"The nationality policy of the USSR, assuring the complete political, economic and cultural equality and the all-around development of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, irrespective of their racial origin, has nothing whatsoever in common with Pan-Slavism.

"The instigators of war, spreading these libellous rumors to the effect that Soviet foreign policy has gone over to Pan-Slavism, are trying to create among the Slavic peoples of the Balkan countries distrust of the peaceful policy of the USSR."[17]

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[15] TASS, Jan. 12, 1941.

[16] *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 105.

[17] *Bolshevik*, No. 10, May, 1940.

TURKEY

Unlike Bulgaria, its ally in the last World War, Turkey has not belonged to the revisionist group of states in the Balkans, for Turkey accomplished its major revisions by force of arms in 1920-22, and by negotiation in 1936 and 1939. As one source puts it, "In Europe and the Aegean, therefore, Turkey by 1937 had successfully secured her position by the Balkan Pact, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee with Greece, friendship with the USSR and the revision of the Straits Convention; in the Eastern Mediterranean by her cordial relations with the United Kingdom and her negotiations with France (in re the Sanjak) and in the middle East by the Pact of July 7, 1937 with Iraq, Iran and Afganistan."[18] With the ground shifted from under this nice balance by the developments of 1939, Turkey once again became the key to the Near East, perhaps the most coveted ally.

For the Soviet Union, Turkey is doubly vital; as the master of the Dardanelles, it commands the sea approach to the Soviet's southern shores, while at the same time it shares with the USSR a land frontier at the base of the Caucasian Isthmus.

Although the Ottoman and Russian Empires were rivals throughout most of modern history, friendship between the two new states that rose out of the collapse of Empires in 1917-18—Nationalist Turkey and Soviet Russia—has been one of the most constant threads in the very changing pattern of the international relations of Kemalist Turkey. To realize that Turkish-Soviet relations have been amazingly smooth, for all their little ups and downs, mention need only be made of the vicissitudes of recent Turkish history—from the Greek war to annul the Treaty of Sevres to the present Greco-Turkish Mutual Aid Pact; from the long dispute with Britain over Mosul oil to the Pacts of 1935 and 1939; the friction with France over Syria and Alexandretta; fear of Italian expansion to the Eastern Mediterranean via the Dodecanese Islands, Italian-held just off Turkey's southwestern shore, and the wide fluctuations in relations with its ally of the Great War, Germany. Reason for the stability of Soviet-Turkish relations may perhaps be found in the fact that

[18] *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 39.

it was on the basis of mutual assistance and mutual recognition that their first treaty was signed in 1921, making what apparently were mutually satisfactory territorial adjustments. Secondly, it is, of course, related to the fact that their desires in regard to the Dardanelles—that core of the "Eastern Question"—have not been in conflict, though not identical, as will become clear below.

In the years of intervention following the world war, Turkey and Russia were drawn together by a common threat from the Allied Powers and their first treaty was prefaced by the statement that the two governments:

". . . sharing the principle of the brotherhood of nations and the rights of nations to self-determination, noting the solidarity existing between them in the struggle against imperialism, as well as the fact that every difficulty created for one of the two peoples makes worse the position of the other, and, in every way moved by the desire to establish between them continuing warm relations and uninterrupted friendship, based on the mutual interests of both parties, have decided to conclude a treaty of friendship and brotherhood. . . ."[19]

In this treaty, Kars and Ardahan were permanently ceded to Turkey and Turkey in return evacuated Batumi. The Soviets also renounced their special privileges and concessions in Turkey, and following this, extended help to the Turks in their war to revise the Sevres Treaty. On this firm ground Soviet-Turkish relations have since been built.

In the present war Turkey is in a most difficult position. As a member of the Balkan Entente, it is bound to Rumania, Greece and Yugoslavia,[20] with additional agreements with Greece (1933) and Rumania (1939). Of these states it has seen Rumania absorbed into the German machine and its territorial acquisitions of the last war taken from it; Greece is now deeply in the war against Italy; and Yugoslavia alone remains in the balance. Vis-à-vis the principal bel-

[19] *Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii, Zakliuchennykh s Inostrannymi Gosudarstvami.* Vypusk I-II, Moscow, 1928, p. 114.

[20] The Balkan Entente agreements, however, were limited by special protocols to protect its members from becoming engaged in war against major powers, and the efforts made at the meeting of the Entente in February, 1940, to extend these commitments resulted only in a statement on the general desire for peace in Southeastern Europe.

ligerents, too, Turkey has close relations with both sides. Germany had gained a growing place in Turkish trade, taking 37.3 per cent of its exports and providing half of its imports. Credits and technical assistance were also advanced to Ankara by Berlin. On the other hand, since the middle of 1939 Turkey has been bound to England and France in mutual assistance arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Allies in the early months of the war concentrated large armed forces in the Near East where they have remained down to the present. Finally, it has its commitments to the Soviet Union, in the non-aggression pact of 1925, Article 2 of which, prohibiting either side from joining coalitions directed against the other, finds recognition in Protocol 2 attached to the mutual assistance pact with England and France.[21]

Now that the war has come to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey finds itself flanked by Syria, nominally under Vichy control, whose actions are problematical. The Soviets remain neutral and maintain good relations with Germany; Turkey's allies are all very much occupied. In this isolation, Turkey has mobilized under emergency powers, but has taken at the time of writing no step to change the all-important Straits regime.

THE STRAITS

The Treaty of Sevres (1920)—the peace "imposed" on the prostrated Ottoman Empire by the victorious Allies,—provided for a management of the Straits to meet the British desiderata of the time, without the traditional check of Russian counter-pressure. The Straits, in contrast to the pre-war position, were to be open in peace or war to warships of any nation, and the administration of the Straits was internationalized. For Turkey such a plan was manifestly unsatisfactory, as it deprived her of sovereignty over the Straits and opened her as a corridor for rivalries of the East. When the Treaty was torn up by Turkey's successful war against Greece, a new regime was set up at Lausanne in 1923. Here, the Soviets were represented.

[21] "The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the USSR." (Shotwell and Deak, *Turkey at the Straits,* Macmillan, 1940, p. 171.)

For the USSR, the question of the entrance to the Black Sea has a threefold interest: as a route of commerce, it is the outlet for the whole south of the Soviet Union, and in winter it serves even larger areas. In 1937, the last year for which complete statistics are available, one-third of Soviet exports passed through the Black Sea customs points, and approximately one-tenth of the imports, both by weight and value. While part of this trade was destined for other Black Sea countries, the bulk of it passed on out to the Mediterranean. It was, thus, quite natural that in the first Soviet-Turkish treaty, reference should have been made to the Straits (Art. 8) primarily in terms of keeping them open for commerce.

The second Soviet consideration is the fact that the shipyards on the Black Sea coast are among the largest in the Soviet Union and it is important that they have the right to transfer naval ships constructed there to other sea frontiers of the Union. It was the closing of the Straits to all naval vessels at the time of the Russo-Japanese war which made it necessary for Russia to send its Baltic fleet on the disastrous long trip to Tsushima.

Finally, and most important, the Soviets have always aimed to make impossible a peacetime concentration of naval power of non-riparian states in the Black Sea, for it was Allied control of the Straits following the last war that made possible their intervention in South Russia.[22] At Lausanne, this was foremost in the Soviets' mind. They were prepared to abandon their right to send naval ships out of the Black Sea in return for complete closure to non-riparian states. But failing to hold Turkish support for this plan, the Soviets lost out and in consequence refused to ratify the new Convention. The Lausanne regime, opening the Straits to all commerce, provided as well that warships of any Power could pass through, though no single country could send into the Black Sea a fleet larger than that of the largest Black Sea navy. (Each could have a minimum of three 10,000-ton ships.) Such a provision, of course, left the door open to a coalition of navies larger than the Russian.

For the Turks, dissatisfaction with the arrangement lay primarily in the demilitarization of that vulnerable area and impairment of

[22] cf. *Shotwell and Deak, op. cit.*, p. 108.

complete Turkish sovereignty over Constantinople and the Dardanelles by establishing an international commission to supervise the traffic through the Straits. With the developments in Europe after 1933, and especially the Abyssinian War, Turkey had adequate grounds for wishing to reassert its full control over the Dardanelles and its right to fortify that area. Its proposal of April, 1936, for a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne met with no opposition, though Italy, still under sanctions, refused to take part.

The conference which convened at Montreux was presented with a Turkish draft which would have satisfied completely both the Turkish and Soviet objectives, and it was only after considerable negotiation[23] that the British succeeded in obtaining any modification in their favor. Nonetheless, on the basic points, it might be said that the USSR and Turkey were substantially satisfied with the results. Turkey regained the right to fortify the zone; it regained supervision over the Straits and full control in case of its belligerency. For the Soviets, they obtained right to exit from the Black Sea for naval vessels, with the proviso that they pass through the Straits singly. What was more important, the total tonnage of warships of *all* non-Black Sea Powers permitted in the Black Sea at any one time was not to exceed 30,000 tons (an escalator clause provides for an increase of this figure, if the largest Black Sea Navy increases by 10,000 tons).

At Montreux a new question was raised, which in the present situation is of utmost importance, namely the rights of warships to pass through the Straits in fulfillment of their obligations under the League Covenant or under Mutual Assistance Pacts. While Article 20 provided that when Turkey was a belligerent "the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government," Article 19 contained much more far reaching provisions.

"In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in articles 10 to 18 outlined above.

"Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of

[23] For a very full and interesting account of these maneuvers see, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*. Oxford University Press, pp. 584-651.

article 25 of the present Convention[24], and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the Covenant. In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable. . . ."[25]

It was over these provisions that the conference almost came to grief. The British counter-draft was based on the theory that the Black Sea was part of the high seas and the rights of belligerents in wartime should not be infringed; and secondly, that the regime of the Straits should not be subjected to the requirements of regional Mutual Assistance Pacts to which Turkey was not a party. Litvinov, on the other hand, maintained that the special position of the USSR in the Black Sea must be recognized, and that not only Article 16 of the Covenant, but also regional mutual assistance pacts should enable warships to pass through the Straits.[26] It is perhaps ironic that with the breakdown of the collective security system and a return to alliances, the British and Soviet positions in regard to the latter provision might well be reversed today. In any case, as the Convention was finally adopted, the policy in regard to the Straits clearly rests now solely in the discretion of Turkey. Although it could open the Straits to British warships under the mutual assistance pacts concerning Rumania, it need not do so, because of the escape clause cited above regarding involvement against the USSR. On the other hand, it could close the Straits completely to warships under Article 21.[27]

At Montreux, perhaps the most significant aspect of the conference was that Turkey easily abandoned its own draft convention in favor of the British draft, and thus equally lightly abandoned the

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[24] Art. 25. "Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

[25] Shotwell and Deak, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[26] *Survey of International Affairs*, op. cit., p. 633.

[27] "Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present convention."

Soviet objectives in the revision, just as 13 years before at Lausanne Turkey had willingly receded from its original position to the detriment of Soviet interests. In both cases, the reason for this retreat, which was made at the cost of subsequent cooling of Soviet-Turkish relations, lay perhaps in the fact that Turkey's interest was centered first and foremost in reestablishing its own sovereignty over the area, eliminating the "internationalization" and "demilitarization" of this vital section of Turkish territory. On the details of the right of passage by naval ships it was more willing to compromise. Yet, one must perhaps look further than this, for at Montreux and in fact during recent years generally Turkey has tended to be drawn more and more into the politics of Europe. With the increasing Italian threat in the eastern Mediterranean, especially as evidenced in the Ethiopian war, Turkey has sought some kind of protection in the eastern Mediterranean. Following the temporary mutual assistance pact with Britain, put in effect during the period of sanctions against Italy, Turkey offered Britain a permanent alliance, which was turned down by the British in hopes of gaining a rapprochement with Italy.[28] Subsequently, Turkey made gestures toward cultivating closer relations with the Axis Powers, whose trade was becoming so important to her. It was among the first to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Franco Spain. Extensive economic associations with Germany especially were being built up through loans for industrial and defense developments. This "middle-of-the-road" policy in the diplomatic struggle which took place in Europe during the past three years was abruptly abandoned in the spring of 1939 when Turkey signed the preliminary mutual assistance pacts with England and France, immediately after the Italian invasion of Albania.

At the time, the Soviets applauded the step as an important, though only a first step, towards Turkish collaboration in a chain of collective security agreements which, they asserted, would only be completed when a pact between England, France and the Soviet Union was arranged.[29]

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[28] *Southeastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 38.

[29] "Novoe vo Vneshnei Politike Turtsii," *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, No. 6, 1939.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1939

With the collapse of the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations and the outbreak of war in Europe, the USSR took a different view of Turkish affiliation to the British-French alliance.[30] The statement of Molotov in his speech of October 31, 1939, gave the Soviet view on the new treaty, as drawing Turkey into "the orbit of the developing European war" in contrast to the policy of neutrality which the Soviets had chosen.

Clearly, he was concerned over the possibility that Turkey might become a belligerent, an act which would immediately affect Soviet trade in that region, or, what would be even more serious, would open the Straits to its allies under terms of the guarantee pact with Rumania.[31] That the USSR had even taken steps to prevent just this was also revealed in the same speech of Molotov. After denying that the USSR had asked for changes in the Montreux Convention, he said:

> "As a matter of fact the subject at issue was the conclusion of a bilateral Pact of Mutual Assistance limited to the regions of the Black Sea and the Straits. The USSR considered firstly that the conclusion of such a Pact could not induce it to actions which might draw it into armed conflict with Germany; secondly that the USSR should have a guarantee that in view of the war danger Turkey would not allow warships of non-Black Sea Powers through the Bosporus to the Black Sea. Turkey rejected both these stipulations of the USSR and thereby made the conclusion of a Pact impossible."

Thus matters have remained, with the possibility open for the Turks to permit the British into the Black Sea where they might then extend the Blockade.

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[30] cf. TASS statement, Oct. 21, 1939.

[31] Art. 3 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty reads: "So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rumania by their respective Declarations of April 13, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees."

Of equally serious interest to the Soviets is the problem of the land frontier which it will be recalled the Turks successfully crossed at the close of the last war. With the constant talk of a Near-Eastern front in the war; with the reported concentration of Allied troops in Asia Minor; with the publication of the Sixth German "White Paper" containing purported correspondence between Gamelin and Weygand regarding the use of Turkish and Iranian air fields for bombing of Baku and Batumi; and with the speculation regarding the possibility of the Allies cutting off the German oil supply at the source, this sector of Soviet defenses has taken on added importance. Despite the geographical difficulties to a land invasion of Transcaucasia,[32] the flying distance from possible Turkish and Iranian bases is minimal. As a matter of fact in March and April of 1940 the Soviets protested both to Turkey and Iran about scouting flights over Baku and Batumi.[33]

PERSPECTIVES OF SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS

The relative alienation of the Soviet Union and Turkey in recent years can easily be traced to the fact that at the very time the USSR was striving to set up a collective security system, the Turks held definitely aloof, preferring to enter into closer economic and diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy, having lost some of its earlier fear of foreign loans.[34] On the other hand, when the Anglo-Soviet-French talks broke down and when war was declared, Turkey went ahead and committed itself to one of the sets of belligerents. It transferred its foreign commitments in the sense of loans and industrial construction contracts to its new allies.

While there has never been an overt break between the Soviets and Turkey, there has also been no marked improvement of their re-

[32] Field, Wm. O., Jr., "Transcaucasia," *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, July-Oct., 1939.

[33] cf. Molotov's speech of Aug. 1, 1940.

[34] In the revolutionary phase of Turkey's development it was "a dominant notion that Turkey must not be in the dependent position of a virtual 'colony' of the Western Powers. Foreign concessions . . . were mostly bought out and new ones were not granted; Turkey did not seek or accept, until recently, foreign loans. . . ." *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 179.

lations. TASS has issued numerous denials of negotiations to form a Bulgarian-Yugoslavian-Turkish bloc under Soviet guidance; of a new Soviet-Turkish trade agreement, etc., along with the denials of border clashes in the Caucasus. Insofar as improvement is possible, it may well find its reflection in expanded commerce, for the economic position of Turkey has been gravely unbalanced by the war. Already the Turks have begun to buy up the foreign-owned plants and the Turkish Government has reverted to its earlier policy of extensive government initiative in economic development. But it is in the sphere of trade that the most pressure is felt. In recent years Germany has taken about half of Turkish foreign trade,[35] although Turkey took precautions against becoming too dependent on Germany through clearing agreements. However, when at the end of August, 1939, the Turkish-German trade agreement lapsed, no effort was made to replace it, in accordance with the new alignment in foreign policy. As a consequence German trade dropped sharply; in the period September, 1939-March, 1940, German sales to Turkey were 12.8 million Turkish pounds as against 43.4 million Turkish pounds in the same period a year before, and its purchases were 12.6 million pounds as against 56.0 million.[36] Such a drop could not but have been a shock to Turkish economy, especially as it could not be offset by Anglo-French trade in wartime. The most serious effect has been the inability to secure industrial imports, with a consequent skyrocketing of prices in the internal market.[37] At the same time the surfeit of agricultural goods such as tobacco and cotton, usually exported, had a corresponding depressing effect on the income of the agricultural population.

With Italy's entrance into the war, the situation was further aggravated because, using 1938 figures, the USSR and Southeastern Europe, in effect the only markets left open to Turkey outside of German-controlled areas, together accounted for only 7.1 per cent of its imports and 8.9 per cent of exports.

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[35] *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 178.

[36] *Vneshniaia Torgovlia,* No. 8, 1940.

[37] Imports for the first ten months of 1940 were 45.4 per cent below those of the preceding year while exports fell only 14.6 per cent. Italy has taken first place in this trade. (*Foreign Commerce Weekly,* Jan. 25, 1941)

In the face of this situation, Turkey made several small trade agreements with Germany during 1940, and its foreign policy has perhaps reflected its economic dependence. In February, Foreign Minister Saracoglu boldly announced that Turkey was not neutral—just non-belligerent. In June, following Italy's entrance into the war, Turkey stated that the situation was confusing and it would not enter the war then; more recently Turkey's position has been described by her spokesmen as "armed neutrality." This, of course, brings it much closer to that of the Soviets.

Trade between the Soviets and Turkey might be somewhat expanded through exchange of textiles and manufactured goods for hides, cattle, raw cotton, fruits, etc. It could even take the form of technical assistance contracts such as those in force in 1934 and later,[38] but any such development would be inextricably tied up with changes in the diplomatic sphere. At the time of writing, the latest reports from the diplomatic front are that the British and Turkish military staff talks have been continued and that no definite shift has taken place in Turkey's policy of alliance with Britain.

IRAN (PERSIA)

Since Iran was coupled with Turkey in the Soviet protest on reconnaissance flights of the Caucasus and in the allegations of the German White Paper, a necessary postscript to a survey of the current problems of Soviet diplomacy along its southern border must concern Iran. Although there are no railroads or other good communications between Turkey and Iran, except through the USSR, and diplomatically they are not close, for Turkey faces west to the Mediterranean and Iran southeast to the Persian Gulf, yet historically both have been involved in Soviet-British relationships. As with Turkey, the original treaty relations with the Soviets were established in the first months of 1921, shortly after the Allied forces had been expelled from the Caucasus, where they had penetrated

[38] The USSR lent Turkey 8 million U. S. dollars to build textile plants, with Soviet materials and aid. cf. *Torgovie Otnosheniia SSSR so Stranami Vostoka.* Moscow, 1938, pp. 48-50.

across the Caspian Sea from Persia and across the Black Sea from the Straits. Again the treaty was phrased in anti-imperialist terminology and even went so far as to give the Soviets the right (Art. 6) to send troops into Persia, if anti-Soviet forces were being formed there.[39] The Soviets returned to Persia all special rights and privileges, as well as all financial and commercial concessions held by Russian nationals and the Russian Government, with the proviso that they could not be assigned or given over to any third power (Art. 13) and Persia was given the right to maintain a fleet on the Caspian Sea.

Since that time the Soviets have signed a non-aggression pact with Iran (1927), and they have in general held a large place in Iranian trade, taking about one-third of the total, since the natural trade outlets for northern Iran lay to the Soviet Union. In July, 1938, however, the trade treaty between the two lapsed and as a result the Soviet's share in Iranian trade fell abruptly. In January, 1940, a new commercial agreement was signed[40] again granting Iranian trade transit privileges through the USSR and establishing the main basis for commerce.

Iran is neutral in the present war, though there have been indications of some tendency on its part to follow Turkey in an alignment with Great Britain. Its relations with England have not always been good in recent years, but its connections with London are naturally close due to the extensive concessions held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In the last year, the economic orientation to England became even clearer, because the war at sea cut off commerce with Germany, which in 1938/39 had replaced the Soviet Union as principal trader with Iran. Lacking transport routes through the USSR after the break in Soviet-Iranian commercial arrangements, German trade with Iran was a casuality of the blockade. Although England made an effort to take Germany's place, pressure of wartime needs made it extremely difficult, particularly in the supplying of industrial imports such as textiles, sugar and machinery.

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[39] For text, see *Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, op. cit.*, p. 107.

[40] For text see *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, No. 5, 1940.

It is in view of this economic situation in Iran that the new Soviet trade agreement is of extreme importance, not only in easing the wartime crisis in Iranian foreign trade by restoring Soviet-Iranian exchange, but by providing transit privileges for commerce with Central Europe. Such a redirection of trade may serve to strengthen Iran's neutrality. Yet it is interesting to note that the USSR in renewing its commercial treaty with Iran has taken additional steps to prevent Iran from becoming a possible base of activity for third powers along the Soviet Caspian frontier. Article 13 of the treaty bars ships of any nation other than Iran or the Soviet Union from the Caspian, and, further, in an exchange of notes attached to the treaty, it is agreed that:

"In view of the fact that the Caspian Sea is regarded by both High Contracting Parties as a Soviet and Iranian Sea, it is of special interest for the High Contracting Parties, as agreed, that each government take the necessary measures to insure that citizens of third countries employed on the ships of the respective High Contracting Party and in ports of the Caspian Sea will not make use of their employment and their presence on the ships and in the ports for purposes outside of the obligations of their employment."

ARAM KHACHATURIAN

A New Soviet Composer

By
NICOLAS SLONIMSKY

Russian composers of the National School of Russian music (Balakirev, Borodin, Cui, Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, and their followers) were always attracted by melodies and rhythms of the Russian Orient. But it was only after the Revolution that minority nations brought forth their own composers who make use of melodic and rhythmic resources of their countries not in the form of exotic stylization, but as creative reconstruction.

One of such new composers, a native of Tiflis (Tbilisi), is Aram Khachaturian. His life history is typical of musicians of his generation who entered adolescence at the time of the Revolution. Khachaturian was born in Tiflis on June 6, 1903, the son of an Armenian bookbinder. He began to study music very late, at the age of 19, when he went to Moscow and enrolled in a music school. He selected the cello as his instrument, but soon his interest turned to creative composition. His first teacher was Michael Gnessin. Later he studied under Miaskovsky and Vassilenko at the Moscow Conservatory. He learned the formal science quickly, supplementing his studies with the analysis of masterworks, from Bach to Ravel.

Khachaturian began to write music almost as soon as he had mastered the rudiments. In 1926, after three years of study, he composed a *Dance* for violin and piano, and in the next year wrote a piano piece, *Poem*. These were simple pieces inspired by the melodies of Armenia, and this folk character has remained the chief characteristic of his style.

At one time Khachaturian was interested in the effective employment of dissonance in modern music. Among the products of this period was a piano piece *Study in Ninths*. But this phase of modernistic experimentation was brief. Soon Khachaturian returned to his true vocation: the recreation of his native Caucasian folk music within the bounds of new harmony.

Although Khachaturian started late, he was in no hurry to catch up with the times and to build up an imposing catalogue of opus numbers. His first performances were always successful, not only with the press, but with the general public as well; and, what is more important, second and third performances followed these firsts.

Khachaturian's most significant composition, in dimension as well as in content, is the *Symphony* which he completed in 1934, "on the

occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Sovietization of Armenia." This Symphony is an authentic expression of the spirit of Armenian music. The ability to recreate melodies in popular style is the crucial test of a national composer, and by that test Khachaturian's Symphony has a claim to success. In melodic structure, the themes of the Symphony are built on small intervals, suggesting the non-tempered scale of the Orient. Once stated, these themes develop by rhythmic multiplication and melodic variation. Multiplication results in an increased rhythmic pace and serves as an excellent device for preparation of powerful climaxes. Variation serves the purpose of ornament. The harmony is functional, unobtrusive, often deliberately economical. The improvisational rhythm of the melody is contrasted with a syncopated figure expressible in the formula 3/8 plus 3/8 plus 2/8. This rhythmical pulsation, in the framework of common 4/4 time is extremely effective when used, as in Khachaturian's Symphony, in combination with the uniform movement in eighth and sixteenth notes.

As orchestrator, Khachaturian follows the traditions of Borodin and Glazunov, contrasting instrumental solos with the full orchestral passages. The effect is secured by means of sonorous accumulation, reaching a maximum brilliance, and then subsiding to another period of calm. Khachaturian's Symphony is a succession of sonorous waves, mounting and receding in conformity with the larger lines of the formal design.

In 1932 Khachaturian composed a *Trio* for an unusual combination of instruments—violin, clarinet and piano. In it he has used not only his native Armenian melodies and rhythms, but also themes from other minority republics. There is an Uzbek theme in the last movement of the Trio, which is adroitly elaborated so as to create an impressive climax. It is a characteristic feature of Khachaturian's music that, although his inspiration lies in primitive folk art, the treatment is of technical interest. Thus this Trio is excellently written for the instruments and is effective from a purely instrumental standpoint.

Khachaturian's *Piano Concerto* is similarly distinguished by technical brilliance. There is some pure virtuoso material in the first movement and particularly in the Finale. The slow middle movement is a poetic interlude with a lilting waltz rhythm. The orientalism of the Concerto is revealed in the scales of eight and nine notes and the consequent emphasis on the small intervals in thematic treatment. Georgi Khubov, in his monograph on Khachaturian, published in the Moscow music periodical, *Sovetskaia Muzyka* (September, 1939), compares the slow movement of Khachaturian's Concerto with the best of Borodin's and is further moved to express an opinion that in this movement there stands revealed the very essence of present-day lyricism, "its perfect inner harmony, its vitality and its folk character."

Khachaturian's *Violin Concerto,* performed for the first time by the foremost Soviet violinist David Oistrakh on November 16, 1940, at the Festival of Soviet Music in Moscow, is a brilliant work for the instrument. Like most of Khachaturian's works, it is in three movements, with a slow lyric part placed between two rapid movements. The use of native Armenian themes lends the *Violin Concerto* additional charm.

In his ballet *Happiness* Khachaturian makes use of dance rhythms of many nations—Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, as well as Armenian. Like every Soviet composer, he has also written a number of mass songs and choruses.

For the October Festival of 1938 he composed a symphonic *Poem About Stalin.* In it, too, themes and rhythms of several nations of the Caucasus are skillfully developed. The concluding chorus of the *Poem About Stalin* is written to the text of a folk poet, Ashug Mirza, from the town of Taus in Azerbaidzhan. Khachaturian has been greatly influenced by the art of the *Ashugs,* Caucasian poet-minstrels who have created a new literature of truly popular poems and tales, succeeding after a lapse of many centuries the great popular epics, *Bylini.* Khachaturian cultivates this new folk art, making it an integral part of Soviet music.

TO TOLSTOY IN RETROSPECT

By GENEVIEVE TAGGARD

Praise Tolstoy. In verse, in fervent memory.
Inscribe his books to your neighbor. Re-live his life.
Speak to him directly. He will seem to listen.
History gives us a voice, great events
Lift him to the mountains of his century.
Rousseau's great child—old man in linen blouse,
Suffering for an answer to his questioning.
It was passion made you an artist, O Rationalist.
Like Moses and unlike Moses. The Promised Land
Comes later, after struggle he could not foretell.
Like Jeremiah, not like Moses, magnificently crying Woe, Woe
Unto you rich, you hypocrites, parasites, people of death,
Crying Woe.
Millions will always love you for good reason.
Millions will study the hard lesson of why you were mistaken,
Understanding much beneath the written page:
The frantic search, frustration, and its force.
Another studied Marx, bided his time. And you
Under the hooded lamp at home read Schopenhauer
And grieved. The way was dark indeed.
"Light," you cried. "Simplicity" "The meek shall inherit . . ."
But the melancholy of your body sighed upon the flame.
Unclassing yourself with oaths, suffering for an answer
To the question of rich and poor, crying Woe, Woe.
Edison sent you a record of your own voice
And you were pleased. The young men Gorky and Chekhov
Came to visit, saw you making boots, called you *aristocrat.*

You writhed like Laocoön to break the golden chain,
Leaving the house abruptly when your daughter played
Beethoven's sonata, rushing into the moonlight
Of Yasnaya Polyana, storming against culture
Wishing to break the mould, the trap of our world
By smashing its art . . . Old Shakespearean Lear
(Take physic pomp)—denouncing the moonlight sonata,
Crying Woe.
Only the very great cry out in this foolish fashion
And seek to unmake themselves for the world's change,
Shaking with protest the smooth front of wrong.
Only people in a promised land have time and intent
To follow complex simplicity to its end.
Men make their own monuments. Yours, our gratitude.
The young Republics are proud of the name Tolstoy.
They bring the thunder of Beethoven to your festivals.
Only the free can do full justice to your anguish.

* *This poem was written by Miss Taggard in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Leo Tolstoy and was read by Miss Taggard at a memorial meeting sponsored by the Philadelphia American Russian Institute.*

SOVIET TRANSPORT, TODAY AND TOMORROW

By
WILLIAM MANDEL

"The work of the Party organizations in the sphere of industry and transport" will be the main point on the order of business of the Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, called for February 15, 1941. The conference will review the degree of fulfillment of the third Five-Year Plan, and if one may judge by the emphasis of current articles in the Soviet economic press, some attention will also be given to the problems attendant upon preparing the transport system to handle the flow of freight expected at the time, not later than 1954 according to Soviet plans, when they expect to reach a per capita production of both capital and consumers' goods equal to that of the United States in 1929.

The operation and expansion of Soviet transport—overwhelmingly rail transport—is conditioned by the major long-term problems it is called upon to solve, two of which are distinct from the problems now faced by transport in any other major country. First, it must keep pace with an economy which is continuously and rapidly expanding. Second, it must carry the extraordinary loads required for the development of the vast virgin areas of the country. Third, it must establish sufficient reserve capacity to handle any emergency as efficiently as possible without disrupting the national economy. This problem, although held in common with all other nations in a world at war, is complicated by the fact that Soviet industry is already operating virtually at full capacity.

At the present moment, the first two and most urgent problems require that by next year the railroads alone attain four-fifths of the traffic level of American roads, measured in ton-miles, with little more than one-fourth the track to carry it on. Some indication of the magnitude of this problem may be gotten from the fact that backward as was the industry and the agriculture which the Soviets inherited, the transport system was not only outmoded, but physically largely destroyed. The Civil War and intervention, fought mainly along railroad rights-of-way and river valleys, caused three-

and-a-quarter billion rubles damage to the railways alone. "In 1920 no less than 58 per cent of all railway carriages and locomotives on Soviet railways were standing idle, battered and dilapidated. Upwards of 2,000 kilometers of the country's main railway lines were destroyed . . . , 4,322 bridges were blown up, and 380 depots reduced to ruins."[1]

The river transport system suffered even more. In 1935, after considerable reconstruction, the barge tonnage, number of self-propelling vessels and total horsepower of their engines were all at approximately half the level of 1913. As for highway transport, Russian roads were proverbially poor. The burden of traffic, then, fell and still falls on the railways, which handled 84 per cent of all freight turnover in 1937.

Due to the tremendous costs of re-equipping a railroad system which was second in length only to that of the United States at a time when industrial production was a negligible fifteenth of the American, it is still on the approximate level of the major European powers in modernization, and far behind the United States. For example, to this day, only 40 per cent of Soviet track has been re-equipped with heavier rails, and even the new rails weigh somewhat less than those on the Rumanian and Yugoslavian roads, and do not compare with those in use in the leading European powers, not to speak of the United States. However, in the proportion of large capacity freight cars, cars equipped with double trucks, and powerful locomotives, the Soviet lines are considerably ahead of the European countries.

Despite these handicaps, the railroad system has for several years past fully met the demands made upon it. Statistics show that it has been necessary to increase the density of traffic to the point where it is now more than double that existing on American Class I lines in the peak year of 1929. Further, the burden of developing new areas has fallen most heavily on the railroads. Where industrial production increased 500 per cent from 1913 to 1937, rail freight turnover increased 540 per cent. Although this and the other figures quoted speak well for the efficiency of operation of Soviet roads, considering their lack of automatic equipment, it indicates that, if

[1] V.O.K.S. Bulletin No. 3, 1940.

the requirements of future expansion of the national economy and the possibilities of war are to be met, the rail system must strike out in new directions.

The major means of solving the new problems of rail transport were indicated in the resolutions of the 1939 Communist Party Congress which saw in the elimination of long, irrational and cross hauls the key to their solution. In the first place, it is intended to lift some of the burden from the transport system by means of decentralization of industry and agriculture, through the diversification of agriculture so that the main crops for local consumption will be produced within each area of the country, and through the building of many new medium-sized industrial plants rather than the giants on which emphasis has hitherto been placed. Further, metal-working and machine-building plants are to diversify their production, and such products as brick, for which raw materials are to be found almost everywhere, are to be manufactured locally, as are many articles of consumption. Much emphasis is being placed on developing fuel and raw material resources closer to existing plants. Most of the new railroads already completed during the third Five-Year Plan serve that purpose—such as the road bringing Karaganda coal to Magnitogorsk, which cuts 500 kms. from the previous haul. The plan thus calls for an increase of 82 per cent in production from 1937 to 1942, to be accompanied by an increase of only 52 per cent in all freight tonnage, and 44 per cent in rail tonnage.

Secondly, the railroads themselves were called upon to eliminate irrational, long and cross hauls. Toward this end, Commissar of Railroads Kaganovich has ordered that henceforth traffic plans be drawn up not merely in terms of car-loadings for each road, but in terms of road of origin and destination. It has also been made clear that roads can refuse shipment of freights which can be secured by the consignee from a nearby source of supply. Further, emphasis is now being placed not only on fulfillment of the plan in terms of total tonnage and ton-kilometer turnover, but also in terms of types of freight carried.

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION

Much of the saving accomplished by eliminating the need for bulk transportation is to go into capital construction on the rail-


MAIN RAILROAD LINES in Service, under Construction, or Projected for the Exploitation of Siberia, Central Asia, and the Arctic.
WELLEN
SCHMIDT CAPE
SHELAGSK CAPE
ANADYR
MURMANSK
KUOJARVI
SUOJARVI
LENINGRAD
ARCHANGELSK
NARYAN-MAR
DICKSON ISLAND
NORDVICK
TIXIE BAY
MOSCOW
KOTLAS
AIKINO
VORKUTA
CHIBIU
NOVI-PORT
NADEZHDINSK
IGARKA
KAZAN
SVERDLOVSK
BUGULMA
MAGNITOGORSK
KARTALI
ORSK
GURIEV
KANDAGACH
NEZAMETNI
NIKOLAEVSK
BODAIBO
TAISHET
KIRENSK
NOVOSIBIRSK
KOMSOMOLSK
SOVETSKAIA GAVAN
KHABAROVSK
AKMOLINSK
KARAGANDA
BARNAUL
STALINSK
MUNDIBASH
RUBTSOVKA
BALKASH
TASHTAGOL
RIDDER
KRASNOVODSK
ULAN-UDE
CHITA
KIAKHTA
VLADIVOSTOK
TASHKENT
ALMA-ATA
SCALE OF MILES
500
1000
In Service
Under Construction
Degree of Completion or Exact Route Unknown
Northern Sea Route
Projected
Newly Constructed

roads. The major item of expenditure is on the building of new lines, of which eleven thousand kilometers are being laid down, in addition to the double-tracking of eight thousand kilometers of old line. The new lines are planned in such close conjunction with the all-round economic development of the country that the Soviets talk in terms of needing only two-fifths of the length of line of the United States to handle the traffic at a time when per capita production approximates the United States level of 1929.

The lines now in construction all form part of the network planned for that economic level. The most important of these is the second transcontinental line from Moscow to the Pacific; three sections of the line are now in construction, and partly in operation. They include the trans-European Kazan-Ufa-Magnitogorsk line, of which a 340 km. section is nearing completion, the 800 km. Kartaly-Akmolinsk line already linking the ore of Magnitogorsk with the coal of Central Asia, and the legendary Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM), of which perhaps a third, divided into sections at both ends, is now functioning. This line, of great military importance, taps the most important gold-producing region of the country, a region rich also in other rare metals, furs, timber, coal, and possessed of almost limitless resources of water-power. No date has yet been set for the construction of a third trans-Siberian line, although its route has been sketched in to run from Nadezhdinsk, north of Sverdlovsk in the Ural steel-and-coal region, to a junction with BAM, north of Lake Baikal. In Europe, a new line will connect Moscow with the Caucasus and another will link the industrial regions of the Ukraine and the Urals. Two more will run from the Urals to the Volga. The Arctic circle is now being crossed by the third Northern line—the others being the Murmansk and Archangel roads—tapping the enormous lumber, coal, and oil resources of extreme North-Eastern Europe and running 1,200 kilometers across two great rivers, the Vichegda and the Pechora, from a point in north central European Russia almost to the point where the Urals descend to the Arctic Ocean: 200 kms. of this line, tapping the oil fields at Chibiu, went into operation at the end of 1939, and another long section should soon be functioning.

New lines completed during 1939 and 1940 total over 3,500

kilometers. In addition to those mentioned above, they include a local line bringing ore from newly-found deposits in the Kuzbass area to its steel mills, relieving the two thousand kilometer haul from the Urals; another short line in the same area tapping local lumber resources, needed for timbering and construction work; the 480 kilometer Karaganda-Balkash line, bringing coal to the vast copper works on that great lake, and enabling its copper to be fed directly to the industries of the Ural-Kuzbass region; the Ridder-Rubtsovka line, connecting with a non-ferrous metal works; a road through the heart of Buriat-Mongolia to the frontier of Outer Mongolia; a long road opening the new oil-fields to the North of the Caspian; and the two lines into Finland, enabling through transport to the Scandinavian peninsula. It has also been definitely reported that the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian has been completed. To equip the 19,000 kilometer total of new line and double track, 8,000 powerful locomotives, 15,000 passenger and 225,000 double-truck freight cars are being built.

Despite the unprecedented density of traffic now maintained on Soviet railroads, the plan calls for taking measures to enable a considerable further increase. The electrification of 1840 kilometers of mountain roads and junctions carrying exceptionally heavy traffic is one such step. Thus far, according to reports in the Soviet press, the largest single stretch of line electrified under the third Five-Year Plan is the 277 kilometer division of the Murmansk road from that port to Kandalaksha on the Kola Peninsula, running through a region of new mining and industrial activity.[2] Longer trains will be made possible by heavier locomotives,[3] the installation of booster mechanisms on existing locomotives, the lengthening and reconstruction of stations, sidings and junctions. Freight cars with

[2] "Kola Peninsula: Gibraltar of the Western Arctic," *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, July, 1938.

[3] *Pravda* reported, on November 30, 1940, that the Kolomna Works is already engaged in serial production of a modernized model of the standard passenger locomotive "SU" to be known as the "SUM." This model has water-and-air pre-heating devices effecting a 15 per cent economy in fuel by comparison with the old. The Soviet's first electric-powered engines for main-line traffic are also in serial production at this plant. The article also states that the construction of 800 h.p. diesel locomotives has been undertaken, and that "SO" locomotives—the widely publicized water-condensing long-haul heavy-freight engines—are now being built to operate on powdered coal, which results

larger capacity are being manufactured to enable the transportation of greater loads on the same length of track, which, in turn, necessitates laying of heavier rail, particularly on the main lines. The need for more cars is evidenced by the fact that the load per axle is the highest in the world, the percentage of empty cars in motion nearly equal to the lowest, and the average net weight per train practically equal to that of the American, although the gross weight is somewhat less.

Although these figures generally attest to the exceptional efficiency of Soviet railroading, they all point to the need for greater efficiency, more and better equipment, and a larger and more highly skilled personnel, if it is to meet the tasks before it. To that end, 200,000 freight cars have been equipped with automatic brakes in the last three years, and 300,000 are scheduled to be equipped with automatic coupling by 1942. The further rapid installation of the automatic block, automatic stop, centralized dispatch and advanced signal systems is also in process. Mechanized loading and unloading devices are being installed, and labor is being trained to man the ever-changing railroad apparatus both at higher educational institutions, special high schools, the well-established spare time courses existing in all branches of Soviet economy. In the colleges and tekhnikums for all types of transport work there are 40,000 and 62,000 students respectively, and the railway schools of the new Labor Reserve Administration[4] have been given a quota of 26,750 for this year. As a result, labor productivity is scheduled to increase 32 per cent in the course of the third Five-Year Plan, in addition to the increase recorded during the Second Plan, when a slight drop in the million-and-a-half total of workers on the railroads accompanied a doubling of freight turnover.

A development toward eliminating way-stops has been made possible by the reorganization of the entire railway system, still in

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in a higher coefficient of use, greater power and fuel economy. The press also reports the construction of a locomotive works in the Kuzbass district with a scheduled capacity of 300 engines a year. The completion of this plant will render the Siberian railroads entirely independent of European supply, as their rolling stock is already being built at Kuzbass, their coal comes from there, and the new plant is scheduled to use steel manufactured from local ores.

[4] "The Recent Soviet Education Decrees," *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Dec. 17, 1940.

progress, on the basis of selecting certain roads as main lines, concentrating technological improvements upon them, and scheduling an increased number of through freights, both by means of better organization of current shipments, and through a study of the freight requirements of entire cities or industrial areas so as to plan shipments in advance. Not only does this permit faster and more efficient service, but it creates reserve capacity on the secondary lines.

That the installation of vast quantities of new equipment does not proceed without difficulty in a country where there is no reserve of technical knowledge is attested to by the remarks of Commissar Kaganovich at the Railroad Day celebration in August, 1940. Although he pointed with pride to the further increase in average speed, average daily run per train, and carloadings, and reported that all cars now have automatic brakes, and 25 per cent automatic couplings, he registered dissatisfaction with various aspects of the operation of the railroad system. Maintenance is at a low level, particularly with regard to the speed of repairs, he said. The preparations for the extreme difficulties of winter operation have not been conducted with sufficient vigor, the plan was still not being fulfilled in so far as the indices of types of freight carried were concerned, there were still too many accidents, particularly as a result of violation of operating rules, and not enough profit was being earned. Within the framework of the plan at large and the future perspectives indicated in the appended table, these are undoubtedly the problems which will receive the greatest attention in the discussion on the functioning of the railroads at the forthcoming Conference.[5]

[5] During the month of November, the Soviet press launched a campaign, which is still in progress, against industrial executives responsible for undue delays in the loading and unloading of railway cars and ships. This was followed by a decision of the Supreme Court ordering lower courts neither to suspend sentence on officials convicted of criminal negligence in this connection, nor, as a rule, merely to fine them or sentence them to compulsory labor in addition to their regular work, but to impose jail sentences. *Izvestia,* reporting this decision in its issue of November 16, cites the case of one Fomin, Chief of Transport for a group of collieries in the Donbass, who was responsible for the delay of 22,000 cars a total of 97,000 car-hours. He had been sentenced to only six months of compulsory labor and fined 15 per cent of his regular salary during this period, although the collieries had had to pay more than 100,000 rubles in fines due to this delay. The twelve jail sentences since reported in the press have been to terms of one to two years.

WATER TRANSPORT

Second largest transport system in the Soviet Union—and unquestionably the largest headache—are the waterways. Having handled more than a third as much freight as the railroads in 1913, they transported only a sixth as much in 1937, little more than half the planned cargo. Where the railroads make a handsome profit, the waterways are continuously losing money, and the 1939 State budget did not even expect that they would break even, having provided for an outlay of 1,840,000,000 rules and an income—hoped for—of 1,671,000,000.

Largest item of river transport is lumber, which constitutes 40 per cent of power-moved freight, not counting that which is simply floated downstream. Obviously, if river transport functioned properly, that item, which is one of the troublesome bulk and long haul freights clogging the railways, could be moved almost exclusively by water and road. The same holds for other major freights. Where, in 1913, a shorter and shallower river system transported as much oil as did the sea and railroad systems, the ratio is now approximately 1:2:4. As a result, the average rail haul of oil has increased from 761 kilometers in 1929 to 1,228 in 1937, while the water haul fell from 1,574 to 1,166. As for grain—and the grain regions are drained by enormous navigable rivers—there was an absolute fall of 25 per cent in the quantity transported by inland waterway from 1913 to 1934, by contrast to the one-third increase in all water transport achieved despite the 50 per cent drop in tonnage of ships resulting from the war and the relative drop by comparison to other forms of transport.

The government has ascribed much of the backwardness of the water transport system to mal-administration. Evidently, the traditional sluggishness and carelessness had become very deeply rooted in the operation of the inland waterways, as the present Commissar had to report 50 per cent of the vessels unfit for use at the opening of the 1939 season, due to failure to make necessary repairs. Although the 1939 turnover reached an all-time high, it still fell short of the plan, except in Siberia, whose rivers handle only a tenth of the total freight.

White
Finland
PECHORA R
ARCHANGELSK
STALIN WHITE SEA
-BALTIC CANAL
NORTH DVINA R
VYCHEGDA R
UPPER PECHORA
VYCHEGDA
UPPER KAMA
LENINGRAD
UPPER SVIR
LOWER SVIR
SUKHONA R
KAMA R
Baltic
UGLICH
VASILYEV
PERM
VOTKINSK
IVANKOVO
MOSCOW
MOSCOW-VOLGA CANAL
German Poland
KOLOMNA
KUIBYSHEV
BUG R
BRYANSK
KALUGA
PRIPIAT R
VOLGA R
DON R
DNIEPER R
KIEV
KAMYSHIN
DNIEPRODZERZHINSK
KREMENCHUG
LENIN DNIEPER
POWER STATION
DON
LOWER VOLGA
NIZHNEDNIEPROPETROVSK
ROSTOV
ASTRAKHAN
Roumania
Azov
Caspian
Black
Turkey
Iran
Newly Constructed
Under Construction
Projected
EUROPEAN SOVIET UNION
Showing the Five-Sea
Inland Waterway System
SCALE OF MILES
100
200
300
400
500

Reports for 1940, although not complete, indicate that the situation is still far from satisfactory. Newspaper references to a shortage of spare parts would point to a repetition, though possibly on a smaller scale, of the 1939 situation. During the harvest there was a veritable storm of complaints about grain waiting on the docks for barges, barges waiting to be unloaded, and dock warehouses still being clogged with last year's grain.

Of all forms of transport, the waterways will get the most severe, and possibly the most detailed going over at the Party Conference. During the last few years, the government has been putting truly vast sums into capital construction. The White Sea-Baltic and Moscow-Volga canals have been put into operation. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, 200 kilometers long, a major artery for trade with Germany, was rushed to completion in six months. The work of deepening and re-constructing the waterways leading from the Caspian to the Baltic and Arctic to handle vessels up to 18,000 tons has made sufficient progress to enable the government to demand a considerable pick-up in turnover. There are also the new arteries acquired, the Dniester, the Western Dvina, the Aa and the Neman, of which the last two each have been carrying 800,000 tons of freight per year.

Only Arctic ocean transport has shown the expected improvement, with 104 vessels in service along the Northern Sea Route in 1939, of which ten made the full trip West to East, and one East to West. The freight transported exceeded the plan by 18 per cent, but Papanin's fleet still shows excessively high costs of operation and survey, with many of the ships not fully loaded.[6] Of great importance is the fact that, as of 1940, coal mined in the Arctic was planned to meet the full needs of its shipping, saving the long haul from the Ukraine. However, Arctic shipping and aviation—30 per cent greater in 1940 than in '39—is only a drop in the bucket, and still serves the purpose of opening up new areas whose commercial exploitation will come later. (The same holds for aviation as a whole, aside from its function as express carrier. Soviet airlines are more than twice as long as those of continental United States,

[6] Ivan Papanin, "Arctic Navigation in 1940 (Arkticheskaia Navigatsiia 1940 goda)." *Sovetskaia Arktika*, No. 5, 1940.

carry one-sixth as many passengers, and nine times as much freight, mainly to Arctic, mountain and other roadless regions.)

TRUCK TRANSPORT

The problems of truck transport are closely interrelated with those of rail and water traffic. However, the manner and degree of their solution is entirely different at this stage.

In 1937 trucks handled only two per cent of the total freight turnover of the country in ton-kilometers, but 56 per cent of the tonnage moved regardless of distance. They were, therefore, already the main factor in factory and farm to train and boat hauling and in intra-urban traffic. Over-the-road traffic evidently did not exist, except in experimental form. In short, the truck had displaced the horse and wagon, but hadn't started to "compete" with the railroads.

Special Commissariats of Truck Transport were not set up until the Spring of 1939. Therefore, truck transport was—and remains—in an extremely unsatisfactory state. While trucks of high quality run off the assembly lines at a rate faster than that of any country but the United States (Soviet truck production having received the concentrated attention of the government for ten years), they are utilized in a manner which officials and the press describe as "barbaric." The training of drivers has been very poorly organized and is under the control of dozens of different organizations. The training is too long and very poor, and only 50-70 per cent of the students pass their tests. With the out-dated equipment and texts in the schools, even those who pass are unable properly to handle the up-to-date machines now coming off the lines at the rate of 750 a day, with the result that Soviet authorities themselves rate only 3 per cent of their drivers as first-class, 11 per cent as second-class, and the remainder as third-class.

Spare part and tool production has been running to only half of plan, and thus continually falls further and further behind the output of trucks themselves. Virtually no repair shops exist, and the Machine and Tractor Stations, serving agriculture, were not planned to service autos and trucks, although many trucks are owned by farms or otherwise serve agriculture. Because of all these factors —poorly trained operators, shortage of spare parts, lack of repair or

even service stations, trucks are generally run until they need basic repairs. The average cost of repairs per year now comes to 60 per cent of the original cost, although fully a quarter of the machines in service are less than a year old. The total picture is of this order—half of all machines are not in use at any given time due to the need for repairs, and a third of the total require complete overhauling before they can be restored to service, while motors or even parts are shipped as much as three thousand miles for repair! Trucks work an average of ten hours a day against the sixteen hour (two-shift) average planned; half of the working time is now spent standing still for loading or unloading; half of the runs now are empty return trips, and loaded runs are rarely made at capacity.

The situation is clearly so serious that the Conference can be expected to take major steps to change it. Articles in the press have been complaining that second-rate administrators have hitherto been assigned to truck transport. The Commissariats, which have been set up within each Republic, will probably be strengthened by additional and higher-quality personnel. The main emphasis will certainly be on the demand that the various organizations owning the truck fleet, from Commissariat to collective farm, assign capable people to the job. It has already been proposed that the Commissariats and industrial committees set up special departments of truck transport. It is also probable that the ownership will be further centralized, as 85 per cent of the present "fleet" is now distributed in groups of one to four machines. Further, the R.S.F.S.R. Commissar, Boreiko, has demanded that balance sheets be prepared by organizations owning cars or trucks on their cost of operation—a method which has proven most effective in centralizing control over other branches of the national economy.

That serious efforts must be made to assure the efficient—or at least satisfactory operation of truck transport—is evidenced by the fact that it is scheduled to handle 4.6 times as much work in 1942 as in 1937, by comparison to an increase in rail transport of only 44 per cent. In other terms, its share of the total will jump from two to six per cent, and much of the difference will be in the vital field of eliminating long railroad hauls by trucking local ores and raw materials to newly-established plants in the Far East and other

outlying areas. Generally throughout the country, and particularly in the industrialized areas in Europe, trucking is to perform the functions of inter-city and farm-to-city hauling it now performs in the United States.

Although 430,000 kilometers of paved road were laid down from 1929 to 1939, by comparison to the five thousand which existed in 1913, the real work of road-building is only beginning. 210,000 kilometers were to be built or reconstructed for trucking from 1937 to 1942,—part of which is included in the total given above. By and large this work is proceeding satisfactorily, as is the manufacturing end of the auto industry. Last year was marked by the mass construction of thousands of kilometers by collective farmers and preparations are being made to apply this mass-movement type of construction even more widely next year.

Particularly interesting is the Soviet emphasis on the development of non-gasoline burning automobiles. Cars and trucks, generating gas from wood cubes, peat, compressed straw, and virtually any other combustible material, have been built and successfully tested on grueling cross-country runs and in regular service. Although minor problems remain to be ironed out, the production of such machines is planned to reach 110,000 out of the 400,000 total truck production in 1942. Special service stations are to be built, including gas-pumping stations for the types which will run on compressed or liquefied by-product gases from industry.

The economy of these cars is obvious. The refining and transportation of huge quantities of oil is eliminated, and each district will be served by the type of special truck which can operate on its local waste, or cheap fuel materials.

But in trucking, as elsewhere, the chief bottleneck is the training of skilled drivers and mechanics, of which more than two million must be trained and re-trained by 1942. When that problem is solved, Soviet truck transport will be able to think of really moving in on the railways—and relieving them of the tremendous pressure with which they are now burdened.

Because of the tremendous latent reserve capacity inherent in the proper utilization of the present truck fleet, it is only fair to note that there are a number of Stakhanovite drivers who have not only

advanced beyond the "barbaric" handling of their machines which is denounced in the Soviet press, but have hung up records of performance which are exceptional even for this country. While the Stakhanovites aim at 100,000 kilometer runs without major repair or overhaul, there are cases such as that of three Moscow bus-drivers, operating their machine in shifts, who ran it 350,000 kilometers before any major repair was necessary. Others have discovered that the ZIS-5 three-ton truck can, with the addition of two trailers, haul up to fifteen tons without damage to motor or chassis. (*Trud* 11/27/40). The press has now begun to demand that both executives and labor unions take steps to popularize the methods and experiences of these drivers, and create conditions under which such records can become the rule, rather than the exception.

The purpose of this article has been to equip the reader to analyze the information and discussion of the transport problem, which will come out of the forthcoming Party Conference. It has, therefore, laid emphasis not so much on the degree to which the transport system has been able to cope with its problems to date as on the new problems arising out of the further expansion of the national economy, and the need to create reserve capacity. The fact remains that the railroads, which are the main means of transportation, have worked to plan during the past several years. Fulfillment of the plan means an annual increase of some 10 per cent in turnover, carloadings and the manufacture of locomotives, and of over 15 per cent in the production of freight cars.

We have also avoided discussing military transport, information on which is, at best, sketchy. It is fairly well established, however, that war-time transport would be os organized as to minimize additional use of the railways. The armed forces are evidently stationed very close to the borders. Nevertheless, the fact that the network inherited from the Monarchy was designed and has undoubtedly been maintained in condition to serve military requirements should not be lost sight of, nor the fact that fulfillment of the plan itself means the handling of vast quantities of military freight in a country where the defense budget for 1940 equaled a third of the national income. As for the functioning of motorized and mechanized military supply, the recorded rapid movement toward newly

established western frontiers would seem to bear out the favorable testimony of foreign military observers at maneuvers prior to the outbreak of the present war, as to the efficiency of these branches of the service. It is interesting to note, in this connection, the appearance for the first time at the military parade on the Red Square this last November Seventh of tractor-drawn nava lguns of a type generally transported only by rail, and of a fleet of small armored cars operating on wheels, rather than tracks, both of which would indicate considerable progress in the building and maintenance of military roads.

The further intensive and extensive improvement in the functioning of the railways will take a tremendous concentration of effort and resources. However, the veritable revolution on the roads between 1932 and 1937 required no less effort, and its successful accomplishment is evident in the progress of the entire national economy during that period. Truck and water transport will begin to function efficiently only when it is found possible to give them similarly intensified attention. When that happens, truck transport may make very rapid progress in a brief period of time, but the inland waterways are likely to improve more slowly in proportion to the greater magnitude of the problems involved.

[Unless otherwise noted, statistics, Soviet and foreign, are from the following sources. All railroad, sea and air statistics up to and including 1937 are from *S.S.S.R. i Kapitalisticheskie Strany, Statisticheskii Sbornik,* Gosplanizdat, Moscow, 1939. Inland waterways statistics are from the *Foreign Inland Waterways News,* U. S. Department of Commerce, Special Supplement, November, 1939. Statistics pertaining to truck transport are from "Urgent Tasks of Auto Transport" (Boevie Zadachi Avtomobilnogo Transporta), by I. Prokhorov, in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* No. 10, 1939. 1942 Plans for all forms of transport are from Molotov's report and the resolution on the Third Five-Year Plan at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party, in *XVIII Sezd Vsesoiuznii Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b), Stenograficheskii Otchet,* 1939. Projected figures for circa 1954 are from "The Main Economic Task of the Soviet Union and the Course of Development of Rail Transport" (Osnovnaia Ekonomicheskaia Zadacha SSSR i Puti Razvitiia Zheleznodorozhnogo Transporta) by T. Khachaturov in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* No. 10, 1940. Railroad statistics for 1940 are from *Pravda, Izvestia* and *Moscow News,* August 4 to 9, 1940.]

STATISTICS ON SOVIET TRANSPORT

	1913	*1928*	*1937*	*Planned 1942*	*U.S.A. (1929)*	*Highest Third Country (Best Year)*	
I. RAILROADS							
Length (kms.)	58,549	76,887	100,000[1]	112,000	370,599	India	43,128
Locomotives (No.)	16,000	....	23,000[9]	32,600	61,257	....	....
Electrified line (kms.)	....	18	1,870[1]	3,023	4,323[3]	Italy	3,258
% of line with automatic block system	....	0.2%[11]	6.3%	....	27.8%	Japan	6.8%
Total capacity of freight cars (1000 tons)	6,045	7,863	15,700	24,700	106,177	Gr. Britain	14,646
Average capacity of freight cars (tons)	15	18	24	28	41	Italy	19
Freight carried (million tons)	132.4	156.2	553.6[2]	....	1,214.8	Germany	447.7
Freight turnover (billion ton/km.)	65.7	93.4	354.8	510	653.1	Germany	72.2
Passengers carried (millions)	184.8	291.1	1,142.0	....	780.5	Germany	2,009.4
Passenger turnover (million passenger/km.)	25.2	24.8	90.9	....	50.0	Germany	47.6
Density of traffic/km. (thousand ton/km.)	1,122	1,215	4,160	5,400	1,930	Germany	1,524
Total run of trains (million train/km.)	381.4	339.4	679.4[3]	....	1,954	Germany	682
% empty freight cars in motion	28.6%	28.7%	26.3%	....	37.2%	Japan	24.5%
Average load per axle (tons)	....	6.25	7.8	....	6.1	Germany	5.76
Average load per car (tons)	....	12.5	15.6	....	24.4	Germany	11.8
Average net weight of trains (tons)	320	420	677	....	729	Germany	309
Average Gross Weight of Trains (tons)	570	817	1,296[2]	....	1,692	Germany	684
%of net to gross	....	51.4%	56.9%	....	43.1%	Germany	45.2%
Average commercial speed (km/hr)	....	14.1	22.5[2]	....	25.7[3]	Gr. Britain	15.4
Average length of freight haul (km.)	496	598	716[1]	....	538	Italy	244
Number of railroad workers (thousands)	971[5]	1,526[4]	1,512	....	958[8]	....	....
Annual production of locomotives (units)	664	479	1,214	....	1,065	....	....

[1] 1940; [2] 1939; [3] 1935; [4] 1932; [5] 1928; [6] 1938; [7] 1937; [8] 1930; [9] 1936; [10] 1923; [11] 1931.

	1913	1928	1937	Planned 1942	U.S.A. Best year, or latest available	Highest Third Country (Best Year)	
II. WATERWAYS							
a) INLAND:							
Length internal waterways (km.)		....	102,000	115,000	52,400[3]	France	13,100
Freight carried (million tons)	48.1	18.3	66.9	....	91[4]	Germany	133.1
Freight turnover (billion ton/km.)	....	15.9	33	58	154.7[5]	Germany	29.8
b) OCEAN TRANSPORT:							
Gross tonnage merchant fleet (thous. tons)	....	335.6	1,308.4		14,663.4[5]	Gr. Britain	23,116.1
Freight turnover (billion ton/km.)		....	37	51	....		....
III. AUTO TRANSPORT							
Trucks and buses (thousands)	10	7.5	806.1[2]	1,700	4,194[7]	England	593
Passenger cars (thousands)		11.2	150.7[2]		25,500[7]	England	1,900
Annual production—Cars (thousands)	....	....	27	400	2,866.8[2]	England	342.5
" " —Trucks & buses (thous.)	....	0.67	183.8		710.5[2]	England	105.1
Trucks used in agriculture (thousands)		....	103[6]		900[8]	Canada	48.4
IV. AIR TRANSPORT							
Length of air lines (thous. kms.)	....	9.3	141[1]	....	59[2]	France	52.1
Mail carried (tons)	....	64.8	11,517[2]	....	8,000[9]	Germany	1,404
Passengers carried (thous.)	0.22[10]	7.0	307[2]	....	1,876[2]	Gr. Britain	200
Freight carried (tons)	1.8[10]	85.3	39,654[2]	....	4,757[2]	Gr. Britain	1,898

Main source: *S.S.S.R. i kapitalisticheskie strany, Statisticheskii Sbornik,* Gosplanizdat, Moscow, 1939.
Also: I.C.C. and C.A.A. Figures in *World Almanac, 1941.*
Foreign Inland Waterways News, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Supplement, November, 1939.
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FIVE YEARS OF RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CITY OF MOSCOW

By
MARTIN LYNN

THE 10-YEAR PLAN

On the 10th of July, 1935, the Government of the U.S.S.R. adopted a 10-year regional plan for the reconstruction of the city of Moscow. This plan is the most ambitious project of its kind ever to be attempted in any city in the world: it proposes to turn the big overgrown village that was Moscow, with all its slums and lack of most elementary amenities, into one of the most beautiful, and in all respects most modern metropolises in the world.

The plan limits the growth of the city's population to 5,000,000 people and reduces the density of population from the existing 1,000 to 500 people per hectare. It calls for the curtailment of further industrial expansion and for the removal of industries injurious to health outside of the city limits. The area of the city is to be increased by inclusion of some surrounding suburbs, particularly those lying on the heights to the southwest of the city, an area found to be particularly suitable for residential development. The city is to be surrounded with green belts of forest parks and agricultural communities which will supply it with dairy and vegetable food products.

The regional 10-year plan provides a radical re-planning within the city whose chaotic growth gave it a maze of crooked alleys and random streets. Though maintaining the existing ring and radial scheme, it calls for the straightening and widening of existing important streets, creation of new traffic facilities, and the elimination of superfluous streets and alleys.

METHOD OF PLANNING

Socialist city planning presupposes the design of houses, streets, avenues, squares, etc. into harmonious architectural ensembles, emulating the best examples of classical and modern architecture and making use of the best architectural construction practices. This

is an entirely new experience in the practice of city planning and architecture.

The discredited method of planning which allowed individual organizations to choose their own architects and proceed, uncontrolled, with their own construction, resulted in architectural chaos, and it has been abandoned. Orders for new planning and construction are now received and coordinated by individual architects or groups of architects of proven ability who are put in charge of the planning and design of entire sections of the city. These architects in turn assign smaller sections of their work, or single buildings, to competent architects working under their supervision. Thus, the planning of a whole neighborhood proceeds simultaneously, under central supervision, with complete coordination and harmony within the community plan as a whole and with careful attention to every unit.

THE SQUARE OF THE PALACE OF SOVIETS

At present the work on the square of the Palace of Soviets holds the spotlight in Moscow's reconstruction. The project of planning the square, its approaches and surroundings, has continued over a period of years, for it was to be the setting in which the monument of an epoch, the Palace of Soviets, was to be erected.

In the search for an ideal solution, many studies were made and many schemes rejected. This year a plan for the new square was finally adopted. The site was cleared and readied for construction. Along the avenues leading to the palace will rise new residential and public buildings. The neighboring shores of the Moscow River will be cleared of all buildings and richly landscaped to provide a beautiful perspective to the monumental building which is in process of construction.

HOUSING

Housing is still an acute problem in Moscow. New construction could not keep pace with the tremendous influx of population into the city. However, the congestion has been relieved considerably. Within the past five years, five hundred new residential buildings, seven to nine stories in height have been completed, providing a

total residential floor area of 1,800,000 sq. meters. A number of these new housing developments included, experimentally, small apartments modeled after those in the United States.

SCHOOLS

As a result of the growth of population and the introduction of compulsory education, school facilities are still lacking to provide properly for Moscow's children, in spite of the large school construction program.

The regional 10-year plan calls for the construction of 550 new schools. To date, 379 new schools have been completed for 336,000 children, and 12 new schools, with accommodations for 10,560 more children, are now under construction. This year 70 per cent of Moscow's children received their education in new modern schools, located throughout the city in the various residential neighborhoods.

In addition to the new schools, Moscow's children were provided, within the past five years, with institutions which are entirely new and unique in the realm of child education, buildings for cultural work, recreation, and voluntary extra-curricular activities. Among these are 29 new children's parks equipped with the most varied sport and game facilities, 13 children's "palaces" with their gymnasiums, science, hobby, drama and music clubs, and 10 art studios. To the regular school libraries which now own 2,077,637 books, 66 new children's libraries were added, housing a total of 1,049,875 books.

THEATRES

Moscow's theatre-going crowd now watches performances in 24 new theatres. Scores of new workers' clubs have been built having their own auditoria, as well as various hobby and sport clubs. In 1940 the new Red Army Theatre was completed, and the Chaikovsky Concert Hall was opened to the public. Construction was begun on a new Opera House, Operetta Theatre and the Theatre for Satire In addition, extensive alterations and renovations were carried out in four of Moscow's old theatres.

HOSPITALS AND HEALTH PROTECTION

Since 1935, 5 new hospitals and 2 new dispensaries have been built. New additions were also made to 24 existing hospitals and

13 hospitals were radically altered and modernized. At present Moscow's hospitals have a total bed capacity of 36,900, 3.6 times the number in 1914. The bed capacity in maternity hospitals is 4,500, 6.5 times the 1914 figure. The new nursery buildings, built in large numbers in every residential neighborhood, care for 45,460 infants. New mother and baby health stations total 141.

Further health protection is afforded by the construction of new laundries, bath houses, improvements in street and house cleaning, and adoption of measures against the harmful smokes and gases from the chimneys of industrial enterprises.

PARKS AND LANDSCAPING

Considerable importance in the regional plan is given to landscaping. The plan envisions 36 sq. meters of green per person in Moscow as compared with 8.6 in Paris and 8.9 in London. Moscow already enjoys 4,384 hectares of parks, gardens, and parkways.

Much attention has been given to the proper equipment of parks for recreation and rest ;sports fields, game courts, playgrounds, reading-rooms, bathing beaches, motion-picture houses, stadiums, amphitheatres, zoos, amusement areas and water sport stations. Beautiful promenades and roads, studded with fountains, sculpture, and other park architecture and furniture abound in numbers and variety. All landscaping is carefully planned for perspective and vista. The new parks and landscaping are equally distributed over the city.

The grounds of a number of large industrial enterprises have been converted from the once muddy and bleak factory yards, into beautiful parks.

ROADS AND RIVER EMBANKMENTS

The first step in the execution of the 10 year plan was to rebuild Moscow's streets and avenues in order to give the city its new shape and make it fit for modern traffic.

Pre-revolutionary Moscow was backward in its road building even as compared with other Russian cities. There were good roads only in the center of the city. In 1914, the total area of such roads was 185,000 sq. meters, while 8,900,000 sq. meters of cobblestones

covered other trunk line roads. Ordinary streets had no pavements at all. Within the last five years, 3,500,000 sq. meters of concrete and asphalt roads were built. The reconstruction of the main avenues entirely changed their previous appearance. The former narrow, crooked streets, are now unusually wide avenues, asphalt paved, with trolley or bus lines, special safe paths for bicycles and automobile parking facilities. All new pavements are provided with proper drainage of rain and thaw waters into modern storm sewers of which 65.5 kilometers were built in the past five years.

All reconstructed streets have underground tunnels for cable and pipe lines, making it unnecessary ever to rip the pavements for alteration of utility lines. Many crossings were eliminated, and pedestrian underpasses were built to increase safety and traffic efficiency.

The Moscow river and its banks play an important role in the new traffic system. Along the shores, speed driveways have been constructed. These form a short route connecting the various sections of the city. It should be noted that previously the banks were impassable not only to transport traffic, but even to pedestrians. The new radial avenues connect with the main automobile highways of the Soviet Union which converge on Moscow. Construction along these avenues has been started on parking spaces, garages, hotels and other services for out-of-town automobiles.

RIVER SYSTEM

One of the most remarkable achievements in the reconstruction of Moscow is in the use of its river. The waters of this river are no longer polluted by wastes which formerly were drained and dumped into it. The length of the Moscow river within the city limits is 45 kilometers. Until 1933, the formation of the river bed as well as its depth were left to nature, resulting in soil erosion of the river shores and the formation of sand deposits on the river bed. There were no roads along the river except in the center of the city.

In 1913, the Moscow river had only 2.3 kilometers of river walls. By 1935, 6.3 kilometers had been added and 10 new granite docks were built. In the past five years 35.2 kilometers of concrete and granite river walls and 16 docks were constructed, and 4.4 kilometers

of old river walls were reconstructed. The new passenger and freight docks are located a kilometer apart. Some of these are so planned and treated architecturally as to afford their use as beautiful observation grandstands for river sports. One such dock has a seating capacity for an audience of 4,000.

The river Yauza which falls into the Moscow river, flows through five of the largest and most populated sections of the capital. Dumping of sewage into the river is being stopped as quickly as the new modern sewage plants are opened for service. The shores of the river which were previously used as garbage dumping grounds, are now turned into paved and landscaped riverside drives. The water level of the river has been raised by diversion to make it fit for navigation.

WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL

The pre-revolutionary water supply system of Moscow supplied only 45 per cent of all buildings, and the sewage disposal system served only 28 per cent. Although the outlying regions inhabited by workers had water supply and sanitary sewers installed soon after the Revolution, the rapidly rising population seriously strained the capacities of both the old water supply and sewage disposal facilities. However, completion of the Moscow-Volga canal in 1937 assured the city of a plentiful water supply. In and around Moscow, new reservoirs and water purifying and pumping stations were built. One of them, the Stalin water station, is the largest in Europe, having a capacity of 600,000 cu. meters every 24 hours. It was planned entirely by Soviet engineers and built and equipped with Soviet material and machinery. Its pumps work automatically and its filters partly automatically.

Between the years 1936-1940, 363 kilometers of main and branch water supply lines were laid. The lengths of mains were extended 74 per cent and that of branches 33 per cent. The capacity of all water supply stations grew from 153,000,000 gallons per 24 hours in 1935 to 288,750,000 gallons in 1940. At present, the facilities of the water supply stations are not yet completely exploited as the construction of the net of water supply branches has not proceeded as rapidly as that of the stations and mains.

The new pumping stations increased considerably the pressure in the water lines throughout the city. The extent of modernization of water supply stations is illustrated by the following figures. In 1913 all pumps were operated by steam engines. In 1940 steam engines comprised only 10 per cent of the total horse-power used, diesel engines 15 per cent and electrically driven pumps 75 per cent.

The tremendous increase in the use of water had a choking effect on the old sewerage system. To replace the old sewers with new ones would have meant digging up all the streets in the center of the city. To avoid this, new sewers were built to receive overflow from the top of the old sewers. A number of modern sewage disposal plants have been built since 1935, and one more is now nearing completion.

Thanks to the extension of the sewerage net, 12,835 houses avail themselves of the municipal sewage disposal system instead of 11,422. The average daily flow of sewage into the sewage disposal plants increased from 80,758,000 gallons in 1935 to 177,500,000 gallons in 1940.

Moscow's sewage disposal system made commendable advances in the scientific-experimental field and in the practical adoption of new methods in the handling and utilization of sewage, and in the maintainance of the sewer system.

TRANSPORTATION

Before the revolution, Moscow knew only one method of municipal transportation—the trolley car, of which there were 1,256 units running over a total length of 132 kilometers and carrying 257,000,000 passengers per year.

In the new Moscow there are five transport methods—the subway, the trolley, the trolley-bus (electrically operated busses), the bus and the taxi-cab, and the transport economy of Moscow is considered one of the largest and best organized in the world. The number of passengers carried in 1939 was 2,567,700,000, i.e. ten times the number of 1913 with only 2.5 times the growth of population.

The subway constitutes a totally new form of transportation to the Soviet citizen. It now has a total length of 23.4 kilometers and 22 stations along its run. The regular, comfortable and rapid service

of the subway trains quickly gained the favor of Moscovites over all the other means of transportation. The subway carried daily 176,900 passengers in 1935, 302,400 in 1936, 424,400 in 1937, 582,600 in 1938, and 909,000 in 1939. As compared with its first years of service, the Moscow subway now carries 6.5 times the number of passengers with the length of its line only doubled. The subway trains run in chains of six cars at intervals of 105 seconds in peak hours.

At the end of 1938, Moscow owned 2,370 street cars. In spite of the rapid growth of other facilities, the trolley continues to occupy a dominating position. In 1939 it bore 71 per cent of the total traffic load. While street car tracks were removed from all important traffic arteries in the center of the city, 155.9 kilometers of new lines were laid to connect the outskirts with the center. Further expansion of trolley lines is being made in the direction of the new suburbs now being incorporated into the new city boundaries.

The first busses which started their run in 1924 were of British make. In 1930, the first two busses of Soviet manufacture were put to work and in 1938 a new model of Soviet make, designed for utmost comfort and large capacity was introduced. Today, 1,257 Soviet-made busses run on Moscow's streets. This is a little below planned expectation which called for 1,500 busses by the end of 1940. The bus routes now total a length of 964 kilometers.

The trolley-bus was found to be a desirable method of transportation in that it embodies the advantages of both the trolley and the bus, containing none of their objectionable features. The first trolley-busses of Moscow began their run in 1933. There were two of them and both of Soviet manufacture. In 1935, the number reached 33 and in 1938, 445. In the use of trolley-busses, Moscow is second only to London.

The taxi service of Moscow, although fifteen years old, did not make progress until the last few years. In 1938, there were 3,890 taxi-cabs in the city. Particularly worthy of comment is the new combination freight and passenger taxi for rapid transportation of light freight, baggage, house-furnishings, etc. Moscow is now served by 860 of such freight-passenger taxis. In 1940, they made 20,000

trips taking families and their belongings to country resorts and back.

River transportation plays an important role in inter-city freight traffic. In 1940, the Moscow city government alone availed itself of river freight transportation to the extent of 1,823,500 tons. Passenger traffic aboard the small river ferries, or as Moscovites call them river trolleys, is not very large. In 1939, they carried a total of 10,000,000 passengers. However, further attention is given to the ferries because of their value for sight-seeing and pleasure riding.

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

The phenomenal reconstruction of Moscow is a tribute to its building industry which itself has gone through a remarkable evolution in a short span of years. Emerging from its primitive character, with seasonal labor, craft production, primitive tools, low productivity of labor and frightful wastefulness of time and materials, it is today a modern industry.

There are 165,000 workers in the capital's building industry of whom 8.8 per cent are master builders and construction engineers. This army of builders is organized into 75 building organizations which own a quantity of mechanized equipment, 140 excavators, 270 lifting machines, 30 cranes, 20 trench diggers and fillers and about 2,000 trucks, having a total capacity of 6,000 tons.

To make most efficient use of the construction machinery, special organizations for mechanized construction work were set up. This makes it possible to serve all construction sites with heavy duty machines.

New building material industries have sprung up. A large number of local plants were organized to aid construction by fabricating or preparing building materials and delivering them promptly to construction sites, ready for assembly or use.

Construction methods are being standardized, and mass production principles are adopted. The new practices cut down considerably the duration of construction operations, save building materials, labor power and transportation. As a result, the productivity of Moscow's building labor has increased threefold since 1935.

Organizational coordination between architects, building material manufacturers and builders has been established. This coordination helps the material manufacturers to improve their products, helps the architects to plan for better and greater use of prefabricated standard units and helps builders to organize construction procedures running on schedule and in predetermined stages.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *In connection with the fifth anniversary of the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow, much material has appeared in Soviet newspapers and magazines on the technical problems involved in the project. Such subjects as experimentation in paving materials, prefabrication, the moving of buildings, installation of plumbing and the like are discussed in detail. Readers of* The American Review on the Soviet Union *are invited to use this material on loan from the Institute library.*

SCIENCE IN THE SOVIET ARCTIC

By
A. J. STEIGER

What scientific exploration are the Soviets doing in the Arctic and why is it important to the Soviet Union? To answer these questions let us review the extent of Soviet Arctic science and briefly describe the geographic background that lends it significance.

The Arctic to most Americans is something exotic, a place far removed and undesirable for habitation. This feeling remains, although to the modern mind no place on earth is remote in space or time. A photograph, taken yesterday in the Antarctic and transmitted through 12,000 miles of space by wireless, appears today in the pages of the daily press. The wireless brings Little America as close to New York as Staten Island, yet the polar research bases there are far removed in geography from the ice-free coasts of the United States. Geographic remoteness is not a feature of the Soviet Arctic.

The Soviet polar stations are situated either on coastal promontories or on islands hard by the Soviet Siberian mainland which reaches within the Arctic circle right up to Arctic Ocean. Never far removed in space, the Arctic to most Soviet people is brought still closer in time by the wireless. Soviet interest in the Arctic, therefore, is not exotic but natural and necessary. Nearly half the country lies on the latitudes of Northern Canada and the people grow up next-door neighbors to the northern top of the world.

Quite naturally then most of Russia's great seamen since Vitus Bering have distinguished themselves in Arctic exploration, and their numbers include Admiral Stepan Makarov, inventor of the ice-breaker. Nor is it unnatural that Russian airmen should be the first not only to use aircraft in Arctic exploration—Nagursky in 1914—but also be the first to fly across the North Pole—Gromov and Chkalov in 1937.

However, only recently have the age-old efforts of the Russian people to master the great northern territories met with any large measure of success. Underlying this achievement is a concerted scientific program of exploration, financed by the Soviet state and coordinated with the practical promotion of northern sea- and airways which link the northern areas to the central regions of the

country and provide a means to develop the natural wealth found in the North.

The scientific program is not piece-meal or periodic, but it is a vast systematic exploration carried out day after day at the network of polar stations embracing the entire Soviet Arctic from the Finnish border to the Bering Strait and from the Arctic Circle to the North Pole, a veritable frozen hemisphere of land, ocean and air. Equipped with an adequate diversity of instruments—aneroids, anemometers, actinometers, tide-gauges, thermometers, theodolites and so on—Soviet scientists are engaged in an adventure of exploring minutely the manifold aspects of nature in the Arctic from the height of the stratosphere to the depth of the ocean floor. Nothing is too minute to escape their attention: even to the production of bacteria in the germ-free North by placing old flour bags in animal manure that would not otherwise decompose, to fertilize the soil. Nothing is too great to halt their quest: even to living on an ice-floe so as to explore better the central Polar basin. While the program is obviously vast in scope, it divides readily into three broad lines of geophysical research. These are research in the AIR, the WATER and the LAND of the Arctic, all allied to the practical work of industrial development and of aerial and marine investigation.

AIR RESEARCH

Physical research of the air, or atmospheric envelope, in the Arctic is carried out by routine observations of the weather, air currents and atmospheric pressure. And many of the polar stations are equipped to carry out investigations as well of atmospheric electricity, magnetic phenomena, terrestrial magnetism, radio waves and solar radiation.

The deviations of the magnetic needle have been charted. Formerly the magnetic compass was almost useless in the Arctic because of the violent and unknown needle deviations. The magnetic charts now prepared for the entire subarctic zone are an invaluable aid to navigators who often must rely on the mariner's compass for bearings. Today, the radio beacon is also used widely for navigation purposes in the Arctic where there are no visible landmarks to fly by.

Research on the spread of radio waves through the upper air levels has been carried out at the Tiksi Bay observatory.

The electro-magnetic properties of the earth are fully utilized for wireless communication, giving an instantaneous diffusion of speech over vast empty spaces. But not only does the atmosphere through its invisible electro-magnetic forces carry volumes of scientific records from station to station and on to research centers in Moscow, but the atmosphere through its wind-energy has also become the power plant for electricity to operate the wireless stations.

The wind-energy over most of the Soviet North has an average force of from 5 m. to 9 m./sec., or approximately twice the force of winds over the temperate zone of the USSR. In addition, the winds are more or less constant throughout the year. The first wind-driven dynamo engines were installed eight years ago and today there are some thirty-six in operation at as many stations in the North. Under normal Arctic conditions a 15-kwt. wind-driven dynamo can produce 60,000 kwt. of electric power a year, which is enough to operate not only the wireless equipment at most average-sized stations but also to provide surplus energy for lighting, heating, cooking and even laundering at the outposts of science in the North.

Solar radiation is another realm of physical research at the Arctic stations. It has been found that the sum total of solar radiation per square inch of horizontal surface in the frigid zone in the summer can exceed the amount received in southern latitudes. As much as one-half the total energy received is diffused in the North. These facts are important for the maintenance of life within the Arctic circle. It is generally known that the "Pole of Cold" of the northern hemisphere does not coincide with the geographic North Pole. The accepted "Pole of Cold" lies in northeastern Yakutia, where winter temperatures as low as 85° F. below zero are the average. This is cold enough for mercury to solidify to "mercury ice." Summer temperatures in this area, however, rise above 85° F. of warmth, hot enough for melons to ripen in the open ground.

This land is presumably colder in winter than the North Pole. Yet life survives. The dry windless air moderates the harshness of the winter cold and the warm summer with abundant solar radiation brings to the nude earth a flourishing vegetation. People not only

live here the year 'round but raise as well domestic animals: horses, cows, reindeer and sledge dogs. The determining factor is the amount of solar radiation during the long polar summer of almost continuous daylight.

In winter the isotherms of temperature radiate out over the northern hemisphere from this "Pole of Cold" in northeastern Yakutia. But Soviet scientists are interested as well in the vertical distribution of temperature. Observations made at the Tiksi Bay station, nearby the "Pole of Cold," have given the first data on the vertical distribution of temperature in the Arctic. Temperature readings were made along a vertical axis at varying altitudes above the earth. It was found that the zero isotherm (C.) in the upper air during the Arctic summer can be above 9,840 feet, a higher altitude than was previously imagined. Convectional or rising air currents are found to be twice or three times as intense in the Arctic as they are in temperate zones. The stratosphere—the upper portion of the atmosphere where temperature changes little with altitude and clouds of water never form—was found to be fairly high throughout the year in the Arctic: in winter at about 26,000 feet and in summer about 33,000 feet.

These studies of the upper air are profoundly important for experts in the circulation of air currents and storm movements around the globe. Their significance is wider than the Soviet North itself. We are told that "Many of the great cyclonic movements which influence the climate of North America as far east as the Great Lakes originate in the western part of the Aleutian chain of islands."[1] A glance at a map will show that the Aleutian Islands reach almost as far as the East Siberian mainland, namely to the fringes of the "Pole of Cold" in the northern hemisphere. "Much 'flying weather' down in the states originates up Alaska way. Alaska brews weather for the states."[2] "The United States Weather Bureau has stated through its chief Dr. Willis R. Gregg, that by the early part of 1938 there was already a substantial improvement in the accuracy of weather forecasting for the entire United States which had resulted directly . . . from cooperation with Soviet stations to westward. . . . The benefit

[1] "Alaska, Outpost of American Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1940, p. 245.
[2] "Our Air Frontier in Alaska," *National Geographic*, Oct. 1940, p. 49.

was greatest, he said, in Alaska and in the western stations but could be felt all the way to the Atlantic seaboard."[3]

The applied aspect of weather research is naturally service to aviation, and research in the Soviet Arctic has already given the preliminary altitudes at which stratoliners must fly to avoid the dangerous ice-formations on wings and propellors when passing through the cold humid clouds at lower altitudes in the Arctic. Moreover, as the science of meteorology advances at a half-hundred outposts in the Soviet Arctic, the general features of air circulation and cyclonic storm movements became known. Flyers can be informed where and when to take off for a flight, where and when they can safely land without danger of cracking up on some fog-bound coastal cliffs. This service, together with the use of radio beams to direct flyers in the air, will eventually reduce trans-Arctic flying to practical commercial value, since the Arctic already provides the shortest air-routes between the North American and Asiatic continents. Safe long-distance Arctic flying will rest on thorough-going, long range Arctic weather observation. Weather research in Alaska aids transcontinental airlines in the United States no less than weather observations in the Soviet Union aid the commercial airways over the whole of the USSR.

WATER RESEARCH

Practically all of the Soviet polar stations engaged in weather research also carry out oceanographic research. The problem studied is the formation and movement of sea ice. Sea ice on the Arctic Ocean is in constant motion, trending northwest across the Polar Basin. An ice-floe that forms northwest of the Bering Strait will, within two to three years, drift clear across the top of the world to pour out with the polar ice pack through the wide strait between Greenland and Spitzbergen, eventually to melt in the North Atlantic. Living and working on one such ice-floe the Papanin party drifted from the North Pole to the Greenland Sea.[3a] Likewise the disabled ice-breaker *Sedov* froze in the pack northwest of the De

[3] Stefansson, Vilhjalmur, *Unsolved Mysteries of the Arctic,* Macmillan, New York, 1939, p. 368.

[3a] See the *Bulletin on the Soviet Union,* Feb. 28, 1938.

Long Islands and after a thirty-month drift was freed of ice northeast of Spitzbergen in early 1940. The rare expeditions of this kind afford an opportunity to study the Arctic Ocean in a highly original way, first attempted with success by the great explorer Fridtjof Nansen.

The chief oceanographic research, however, is carried out in the routine work of the polar stations, in special hydrographic survey boats and in airplane patrols which explore the ice conditions of the coastal seas through which ships navigate during the brief Arctic summer. Unlike the central Polar Basin, the coastal seas do not have a permanent ice pack throughout the year. In the summer from about early July to late October their ice cover is broken up by the warm weather and by the waters of the great Siberian rivers, all of which flow north, ultimately to discharge their waters into the coastal seas.

For about four months in summer these rivers are entirely open to navigation and pour down billions of gallons of warm fresh water. Such a river as the Yenisei, flowing north across central Siberia, during the month of June and July every year empties out more than half its annual drain. Some rivers freeze up entirely in winter. The Yenisei has a very much reduced flow in winter; whereas on some years as much as forty per cent of the annual drain flows out during the spring floods of June alone, when the high water rises often to sixty feet above the mean river level.

Naturally with such a rush of warm fresh waters from the mouths of the Siberian rivers, the ice on the coastal seas, already melting under the radiant heat of the summer's continuous daylight, rapidly disintegrates; some of the ice vanishes entirely, while other fields of ice are set adrift in sea currents caused in part by the circulation of incoming river waters. Between islands of drifting ice floes are leads of open water over the coastal seas. Through this area passes the Northern Sea Route, navigated now by more than a hundred vessels annually.

One problem studied is how does the transfer of heat from the warm waters of the Yenisei and Ob rivers influence ice conditions in the Kara Sea, once called an "ice-cellar," closed to ships. It has been found that years when there are exceptionally high floods in the

spring on the Yenisei and the Ob are years when the ice is relatively thin or absent completely over large areas of the Kara Sea. Years of medium spring floods are years of medium sea ice. Years of low water in spring are years of heavy ice. Regular measurements are now being made of the volume of the spring flood. With a given spring flood, fairly accurate estimates can now be made of what general ice conditions are to be expected in the summer.

Sea ice drifts under the influence of winds, ocean currents and tides. These phenomena are also studied and measured. The purpose of this work is to establish the laws of ice movements. Enough progress has already been made to organize what are known as ice-forecast bureaus. For the past three years, during the navigation season an ice-forecast bureau has been issuing ice bulletins from Dickson Island for the Kara Sea. In 1939 a similar bureau began to function at Cape Schmidt for the East Siberian and the Chukot Seas. The work of this bureau is described as follows:

"All the essential material received by wireless from the polar stations, ice patrol planes and ships at sea is plotted on a hydrosynoptic chart which shows the ice conditions, distribution of atmospheric pressure, resulting wind stresses, drift of the sea ice and isotherms of temperature for water and air. For definite periods of time these charts summarize activity in both the ocean and the atmosphere. They are the preliminary step in making forecasts by analysis of present conditions."[4]

Ice experts declare that the present weather service, if admitting of great accuracy in forecasts for a few days ahead, can give only approximate weather forecasts for the ten-day period covered as a rule by the short-term ice forecast. An accurate weather forecast is half the job of ice forecasting, since the weather conditions influence the ice movements. However, it is said to be easier in general to predict weather changes, because the sea ice is relatively inert and less influenced by wind stresses than is commonly assumed. While ice forecasting is still in a rudimentary stage of development, the accuracy of forecasts now being issued is already as much as 75 per cent correct.

[4] "Ice Service in Eastern Arctic," *Sovetskaia Arktika*, No. 4. 1940, pp. 41-42.

In navigating the Arctic seas, the attempt is made to search out ice-free passages, or leads. But this is not always possible and there are big ice-breakers stationed at difficult passages to force through ice-jammed passages. The Soviet Union has the largest ice-breaker fleet in the world, totalling forty vessels, eight of which are huge ships of from 5,000 to 12,000 h.p. The others are smaller craft built with ice-breaking features and used for transport service. Performance of the ice-breakers is constantly checked during the navigation period in the north. A research group of ship designers travelled with the ice-breaker *J. Stalin* in 1940 to see how the new Soviet-built vessel performed. Ship design is based not only on such performance tests but also on research in the kind of sea ice that has to be forced.

In most of the seas navigated it has been found that rarely is sea ice encountered thicker than seven feet, even in winter. Taking this as a base figure ship designers now make proposals to build a super ice-breaker envisaged as having the following specifications: 50,000 h.p. diesel engines, 24,000-ton displacement, 10,000-mile cruising radius and able to force seven-foot ice at one mile per hour.[5] Such a vessel should be able to navigate the entire Northern Sea Route even in winter. Some assistance in mechanical breakage of the ice would come, possibly, from weakening the sea ice cover by means of hydraulic monitors which squirt a needle jet of high pressure water into the pack, immediately under the ship's prow. Such a jet of water, if it only partially penetrated the ice, would act like an ice pick cracking the ice and greatly reducing its resistance to breakage. The hydraulic ice pick is reported to be undergoing test operation.

LAND RESEARCH

In the land areas of the Arctic, physical research is not limited to geodesic survey and topographical work in general. This work continues and the Arctic Institutes have established 273 astronomical positions as marks for surveyor's measurements in the north. Most interesting are the geological surveys and the research in northern soils which are also on the program. Literally hundreds of geologists,

[5] "New Arctic Ships," *Sovetskaia Arktika*, No. 6, 1940, p. 17-25.

in small and large parties, are constantly at work, summer and winter, surveying the stratigraphic lay of the land in the Far North. Along mountain streams, frozen to the bottom in winter but rushing torrents in summer, they penetrate to high mountain fastnesses in northeastern Yakutia, in Asia's northernmost headland, the Taimyr, and in the Chukot peninsula, opposite Alaska. By reindeer, dog-team, motor boat and airplane they explore through the wilderness of the northern regions down to the treeless tundra along the Arctic seas, digging up fossils for laboratory study, weighing and analyzing pieces of ore and metal.

The geologists only decipher the earth's long history to find more easily the locations of rare minerals buried in the folded convolutions of the surface. Their maps leave much to the imagination for the layman but point as accurately as a weather map to the areas where mineral deposits have been located and can be expected by the prospector. As their work progresses the age and stratification of rock formations all over Arctic Siberia becomes an open book for the State Planning Commission. Here, we can only suggest the scope of applied industrial arts which flourish on the work of geologists who are out locating the sites of future mines and mills. Already gold, nickel, platinum, iron and fluorite mines have been sunk and mills erected to refine the raw ores for economic use. Rock salt deposits are exploited to obtain northern salt for northern fisheries. Oil prospecting continues at several promising locations, to obtain fuel for Arctic aviation. Coal mines are already producing the fuel on which Arctic ships are navigated; in 1940 all the Arctic ships were operated on coal mined in the Arctic.

In the study of northern soils, stress is placed on the vegetation resources of what have been called the "barren lands." The subsoil that is found on most of Siberia is permanently frozen, as much as 2,000 feet underground. Plant life in the Arctic thrives in the active layer of soil which thaws during the summer. Brief though the polar day is, the tundra blooms with a riot of verdure. Saxifrage, lichens, Arctic poppy, violets and other wild flowers grow in soil that thaws less than a foot underground. Beneath their roots is ice. The deeper the unfrozen ground in summer the better for vegetation. How can the active layer be deepened? Research has shown that when tundra

lakes are drained of water, the spring and summer convert them to meadows of cereal grass, adequate to pasture milch cows and horses, as well as for hay-making to obtain forage for the winter. The reason for this is that the ground underneath water bodies remains unfrozen for as much as 60 feet deep, whereas in the surrounding area the ground thaws from 11 to 20 inches only. When the water is drained from a lake, the bottom land has a deep active layer of unfrozen soil, part of which does not freeze even in winter. A drained lake will retain a deep active layer of soil for at least a century, experts say, because once the permanently frozen substratum has been depressed by the warmth of a water body, it does not quickly recover. The trees and bushes which thrive along rivers and lakes in a generally treeless tundra are attributed to the fact that there is a deep unfrozen stratum underlying and around the vicinity of water bodies. To obtain good meadow land it is proposed to drain many of the numerous tundra lakes.[6] Moreover, plant specialists at work in the Taimyr Peninsula have found Arctic raspberries and flax to ripen in the flood plains of rivers. These plants require as much solar heat to ripen as do barley and potatoes.

If these established facts be combined with the known abundance of solar energy during the polar day, it can readily be seen why Soviet agronomists are cheerful about the prospects for developing vegetable gardens, dairy farms and livestock raising in the Arctic. "Agriculture can be promoted anywhere the sun shines," they declare. Agriculture is now carried on in the Taimyr Peninsula where before 1936 there was not one vegetable garden, one cow or horse.

During the polar day plants grow with tropical speed, so fast that they would become spindly stems but for the artificial "night" created eight hours daily by spreading a tarpaulin over the hotbed frames. Turnips, carrots, cabbage, potatoes, some grain, even domesticated strawberries, currants, raspberries, etc. are grown at many places in the open ground within the Arctic circle. Of these points, mention is made of Igarka along the lower Yenisei and of Abyi in the Indigirka river valley near the "Pole of Cold" in winter. Both places have a frost-free period of about 100 days in summer and get

[6] "Agricultural Reclamation of Chukotka," *Sovetskaia Arktika*, No. 6, 1940, pp. 57-61.

from 1,000 to 1,285 degrees of solar heat. Until ten years ago agriculture had not been promoted here at all, except for a few square meters tilled by indefatigable plant lovers.

CONCLUSION

An exhaustive treatment of science in the Soviet Arctic would include as well the research work being done on the natural resources of seal, walrus and whale in northern waters, of eider duck and other Arctic birds, of white Arctic fox, ermine and other fur-bearing land animals. The program of zoological study is no less coordinated and systematic than the program of geo-physical research, because only with such a planned methodical approach can progress be made against the vast frozen hinter-land of the Arctic. All the scientific work in the Arctic, however diversified in the specific problems studied, stems from a single nation-wide organization, the All-Union Arctic Institute, supported by the Soviet State and, therefore, despite temporary setbacks inevitably encountered in research work, able to carry on with generally uniform success.

Within the framework of state-financed exploration there is wide latitude for individual initiative in devising the methods best adapted to promote commercial shipping through the Arctic seas and to develop industrial life in the land of the midnight sun. Research in Arctic weather, ice-forecasting and northern agriculture on the scale which is now being carried out in the Soviet Arctic is something new in scientific endeavor and it is finding due recognition among scientists throughout the world.

DOCUMENTS

ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF TUITION FEES

Taking into account the rise in the living standards of the working people and the substantial expenditures borne by the Soviet State for the construction, equipment and maintenance of the ever-increasing number of secondary and higher educational schools, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR considered it necessary that part of the expenses of tuition in secondary schools and higher educational establishments be borne by the working people themselves, and in this connection has decided:

1. To introduce as of September 1, 1940 ,tuition fees for the 8th, 9th and 10th classes of secondary schools and in higher educational establishments.

2. To set the following tuition fees for the 8th to 10th classes of secondary schools:
   a. 200 rubles a year for the schools of Moscow and Leningrad, and also for the schools in the capitals of the Union Republics;
   b. 150 rubles a year for the schools of all other cities, as well as villages.
   Note: The tuition fees for the 8th to 10th classes of secondary schools apply to students of technical, pedagogical, agricultural and medical schools and other special secondary schools.

3. To set the following tuition fees for higher educational establishments of the USSR:
   a. 400 rubles a year for higher educational establishments in Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of the Union Republics;
   b. 300 rubles a year for higher educational establishments in other cities;
   c. 500 rubles a year for higher educational establishments giving instruction in art, the theatre, and music.

4. Tuition fees to be paid to the corresponding educational institutions in equal sums, twice a year: on September 1 and February 1.
   Note: Payment for the first half of the 1940-41 term to be made not later than November 1, 1940.

5. Payment for correspondence courses in secondary and higher educational establishments to be fixed at half the regular tuition fee.

6. Beginning November 1, 1940, stipends are to be granted only to those students of higher educational establishments as well as pupils of technical schools who excel in their studies.

(Source: *Moscow News,* Oct. 3, 1940)

DECREE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE LABOR RESERVES IN THE USSR

With the object of creating state labor reserves for industry, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolves:

1. To recognize as essential the annual training for industry of state labor reserves of from 800,000 to 1,000,000 persons by teaching the urban and collective farm youths

definite industrial professions in Trade Schools, Railway Schools and Industrial Training Schools.

2. To organize Trade Schools with a two-year course of study in cities for training skilled metal workers, metallurgists, chemists, miners, oil workers and workers of other skilled professions, as well as qualified workers for marine transport, river transport and communications.

3. To organize Railway Schools with a two-year course of study for the training of skilled railway workers, assistant locomotive engineers, locomotive and car repair men, boiler makers, crew leaders for track repairs and other skilled workers.

4. To organize Industrial Training Schools with a six months' course of study for training workers of the more widely applied professions, in the first place for the coal, mining, metallurgical and oil industries, and building trades.

5. To establish that instruction in Trade Schools, Railway Schools and Industrial Training Schools is to be free of charge, and that pupils are to be maintained by the state during the period of their studies.

6. To establish that the State reserves of labor power are to be under the direct jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and are not to be utilized by people's commissariats and enterprises without permission of the Government.

7. To empower the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR annually to draft (mobilize) from 800,000 and 1,000,000 persons of the urban and collective farm youths (male) of 14 and 15 years of age, for training in Trade and Railway Schools, and of 16 and 17 years of age, for Industrial Training Schools.

8. To obligate chairmen of collective farms to designate by drafting (mobilizing) annually two youths (male) of 14 and 15 years of age for Trade and Railway Schools and of 16 and 17 years of age for Industrial Training Schools per each 100 members of the collective farm, counting men and women between the ages of 14 and 55.

9. To obligate City Soviets of Working People's Deputies annually to designate by drafting (mobilizing) youths (male) of 14 and 15 years of age for Trade and Railway Schools and of 16 and 17 years of age for Industrial Training Schools, the number being fixed annually by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

10. To establish that all those who graduate from the Trade Schools, Railway Schools and Industrial Training Schools are to be considered as mobilized and are obliged to work four years continuously in state enterprises, as directed by the Central Labor Reserves Administration under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, securing them wages at the place of work in accordance with general rates.

11. To establish that all persons graduating from Trade Schools, Railway Schools and Industrial Training Schools are to be temporarily exempted from being drafted into the Red Army and Navy until the period of obligatory work in state enterprises, in accordance with Article 10 of the present edict, expires.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
M. KALININ

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
A. GORKIN

Moscow, October 2, 1940.

TEXT OF THE SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT

Inasmuch as the term of operation of the Fisheries Convention between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, signed January 23, 1928 and prolonged by protocols signed May 25, 1936, December 28, 1936, December 29, 1937, April 2, 1939, December 31, 1939, expired on December 31, 1940; and inasmuch as a new convention was not concluded before December 31, 1940, the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Japan have agreed on the following articles:

Article 1. The Fisheries Convention between the USSR and Japan, as well as all documents appended thereto, signed January 23, 1928, remain in force until December 31, 1941.

Article 2. The present protocol is to be replaced by a new Convention, regarding which the Governments of the USSR and Japan are now conducting negotiations which will be concluded in the course of 1941.

In confirmation of which, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed the present protocol.

Made in two copies in Moscow, January 20, 1941, which corresponds to the twentieth day of the first month of the sixteenth year of Showa.

Statement by Tass Regarding the Soviet-Japanese Agreements of January 20, 1941

An agreement between the USSR and Japan was published today regarding the prolongation for 1941 of the Fisheries Convention of 1928, which had already previously been prolonged in 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940.

The agreement for the prolongation of the Fisheries Convention for 1941 was signed as the result of negotiations held in November and December 1940 and January 1941 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, and Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa. As compared with the agreement for 1940, the agreement for the prolongation of the Fisheries Convention for 1941 contains a new essential clause providing for a 20 per cent addition to the rental, this amount being added not only to the sum of the rental but also to the global sum of taxes and to the taxes paid by the Japanese fishery owners. It should be borne in mind that the Japanese fishery owners paid the Dalryba Trust during 1940 the following sums for rented lots: rental, 7,004,615 rubles; aggregate taxes and duties, 1,961,292 rubles; total 8,965,907 rubles.

Under the present agreement, the Japanese fishery owners will have to pay in 1941 an additional sum of 20 per cent on the total payments due in 1941 for rental and for the global sum of taxes and duties. By means of the so-called gold clause, set forth in Article 4 of the note of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, addressed to the Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa, the signed agreement guarantees the Soviet Union against loss in connection with any possible fluctuation of the yen.

The agreement on the prolongation of the Fisheries Convention for 1941 undoubtedly constitutes a step forward in the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

(*Ed. Note.* Art. 2 of the note regarding the Fisheries limits the 1941 salmon catch of the Soviet State Industry to five million poods.)

CURRENT ARTICLES ON THE SOVIET UNION

Cash, J. Allan, "The Balkans: Key to the War Situation," *The Contemporary Review,* September, 1940, pp. 298-306.

Collard, Dudley, "The Soviet Bar," *The Anglo-Soviet Journal,* October, 1940, pp. 327-339.

Dean, Vera M., "Germany Plans to Expand Trade with Russia," *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* January 17, 1941.

Dobb, Maurice, "The Location of Industry in the U.S.S.R.," *The Anglo-Soviet Journal,* October, 1940, pp. 292-302.

Haldane, J. B. S., "Lysenko and Genetics," *Science and Society,* Fall, 1940, pp. 433-7.

Howard, Harry N., "The Riddle of the Red Army," *Events,* December, 1940, pp. 448-451.

"Industrial Training of Young Workers in the U.S.S.R.," *International Labour Review,* December, 1940, pp. 404-405.

Jaffe, P. J., "China Faces New Danger," *Amerasia,* November, 1940, pp. 397-401.

King, Beatrice, "Family Life in the U.S.S.R.," *The Anglo-Soviet Journal,* October, 1940, pp. 311-320.

Kunitz, Joshua, "A New Nation Is Born," *Soviet Russia Today,* January, 1941, pp. 9-10, 30-31.

Lloyd, A. L., "Chaikovsky in the Soviet Union," *The Anglo-Soviet Journal,* October, 1940, pp. 321-6.

Lode, M., "The Attitude Toward Work Under the Soviets," *The Communist International,* No. 10, 1940, pp. 714-733.

Lowe, Gordon, "Will the Soviets Desert China," *China Today,* January, 1941, pp. 7-8.

"Opening of Consulate General at Vladivostok," *The Department of State Bulletin,* December 14, 1940, p. 551.

Phillips, G. D. R., "Bouryat-Mongolia," *The Anglo-Soviet Journal,* October, 1940, pp. 281-291.

Ponomarev, B., "The Forty-fifth Anniversary of the Death of Frederick Engels," *The Communist International,* No. 10, 1940, pp. 655-675.

Siegal, Anna, "Ukrainian Interlude," *Magazine Digest,* January, 1941, pp. 61-65.

Smith, Jessica, "The Labor Reserve Schools Open," *Soviet Russia Today,* January, 1941, pp. 12-13, 32.

Spector, Ivar, "How Strong Is Soviet Russia?" *Amerasia,* January, 1941, pp. 499-503.

Russian Economic Notes, a source for translations and abstracts of items taken from Soviet newspapers and magazines, is no longer published by the United States Department of Commerce. A similar service can be found in their new publication *Foreign Commerce Weekly* which in recent issues has contained material on the reconstruction of Moscow, labor discipline in Machine Tractor Stations, operations in the Soviet Arctic in 1940, reforms in trade union organization, etc.

Books and Pamphlets

Dean, Vera Micheles, "Russia and the 'New Order' in Europe," *Foreign Policy Report,* December 15, 1940, pp. 230-240, 25c.

A useful summary of the USSR's relations with Great Britain and Germany, citing Soviet statements on recent events and concluding that "Moscow's chief objective is to preserve the neutrality of the Soviet Union and to avoid war in Europe and Asia . . . intervening only to protect what it considers its territorial security. . . ." The careful documentation that characterizes most of the article is permitted to lapse on page 237, however, where Mrs. Dean has "Soviet writers" labeling "the middle class" as "fascist," and where "plebiscites" are cited as the means by which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided to request inclusion of their territories in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. R.M.S.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1925. U. S. Dept. of State, Washington, D. C., 1940. Vol. I. 957 pp., Vol. II. 759 pp.

The latest volumes of the series contain a few papers dealing with the problems arising out of the absence of diplomatic relations with USSR, as well as those on the refusal of the State Dept. to intervene in behalf of the Sinclair Oil Company when its concession on Sakhalin was cancelled. —H.L.M.

Shotwell, James T. and Francis Deak. *Turkey at the Straits,* The Macmillan Company, N. Y., 1940. 196 pp.

This short history of the struggle for control of the entrance to the Black Sea is particularly useful as a reference in its specific citation of treaties, etc. While the section dealing with the post-world war period is regrettably short, the book comes down to the spring of 1940. The appendix includes the text of the Treaties of Sevres, Lausanne, and Montreux regarding the Straits and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between England, France and Turkey of October 10, 1939.—H.L.M.

NEWS CHRONOLOGY

Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parenthesis following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared. The source in brackets gives a full English text.
(N.Y.T.—New York Times; N.Y.H.T.—New York Herald Tribune; D.W.—Daily Worker.)

*The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ADMINISTRATION

September

3—The Supreme Soviet establishes a gold, platinum and diamond star emblem to be worn by Marshals of the Red Army.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)

6—A People's Commissariat of State Control of the USSR is established with Lev Mekhlis, former chief of the political department of the Red Army, at its head.—*Pravda* (7)

7—A. Y. Vyshinsky is named first Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

7—P. N. Pospelov is named editor of *Pravda* by the central committee of the Communist Party. The paper was formerly administered by an editorial board.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

December

15—Town and district soviets are elected in the first local elections held in the Western Ukraine and the Karelo-Finnish SSR.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

AGRICULTURE

September

2—A radio broadcast announces that the 1940 Soviet grain crop is expected to exceed that of last year.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)

October

11—It is announced that the 1940 Soviet grain harvest plan is fulfilled by state and collective farms.—*N.Y.T.* (12)

COMMUNIST PARTY

September

7—G. F. Alexandrov is named head of the Propaganda Department by the Communist Party, replacing Andrei Zhdanov who still retains the right to control this work.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

December

20—The 18th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party is called for February 15 to discuss primarily party organizations in industry and transport.—*D.W.* (21)

DEFENSE

September

3—Autumn maneuvers of the Red Army take place throughout the Soviet Union—*D.W.* (4)

4—The Soviet classes of young men born in 1920 and the first eight months of 1921 are called up for military training, as are those born in 1921 and 1922 who have completed secondary education.—*N.Y.T.* (5)

6—Maneuvers of the Soviet Baltic Fleet are completed. Admiral Kuznetsov speaks of plans for strengthening the fighting power of the Red Navy.—*D.W.* (7)

23—Maneuvers are started in the Kiev Military District.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)

24—The People's Commissariat of the Navy orders Soviet officers in the Red Fleet, the Coast Guard and the Naval

Air Force to wear a dress sword.—*N.Y.H.T.* (25)

October

5—In a speech to the graduates of a military academy, Commissar of Defense Timoshenko warns that the Soviet Union must be ready for any emergency and that the Red Army's fighting capacity must be strengthened.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)

7—Defense Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of Staff Meretskov review Red Army maneuvers in the Leningrad Military District—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)

8—A. I. Zaporozhets is appointed chief of the political department of the Red Army. The new chief was formerly a division commissar and member of the Moscow Military Council. —*Krasnaia Zvezda* (8)

12—*Pravda* editorializes, after a series of tactical exercises involving units of the Red Army and the Red Navy, that the tactics, methods of defense and attack and the system of military training must be changed to conform with realities, such as those experienced in the Finnish and Far Eastern border conflicts.—*D.W.* (13)

November

3—An order is issued creating ranks of junior commanders in the Red Army, in order to fill the gaps between troops and commissioned officers.—*N.Y.T.* (4)

7—The twenty-third anniversary of the October Revolution is celebrated with Soviet military strength displayed in the parade in Red Square, Moscow. Defense Commissar Timoshenko, the principal speaker, while stressing the Soviet's desire for peace and neutrality, yet urged vigilance and preparedness in the light of the world situation.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

9—General Loktionov, former chief of the Soviet Air Force, is appointed commander of a Baltic military district.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)

10—Lieut. Gen. V. Kachalov is named commander of the Archangel military district, and Lieut. Gen. Yakov Cherevichenko chief of the Odessa military district.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)

16—All Red Army reservists between 19 and 50 and men from 40 to 50 who had not been in military service, together with women in defense industries between the ages of 19 and 50 are required to reregister during December, 1940.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

30—President Kalinin's speech to the Red Army Political Academy delivered previously is published. In it, Kalinin calls for "eternal vigilance," increased armed force, and improved discipline, in the light of the world situation in which he stated that the Soviet Union was like a beleaguered fortress.—*N.Y.T.* (Dec. 1.)

ECONOMIC LIFE

October

21—A decree is passed raising the price of bread in Moscow and Leningrad and lowering the price of potatoes.—*N.Y.T.* (22)*

December

9—The Supreme Economic Council decrees the rationing of gasoline for passenger automobiles.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)

EDUCATION

October

2—A decree is passed establishing State Labor Reserves to be drawn from youths between the ages of 14 and 17 who will be trained in free vocational schools and who will work four years in their specialty following the period of instruction.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)* (cf. Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1940.)

3—A decree is passed eliminating stipends for most Soviet students and fixing tuition fees for study above the seven-year school level.—*N.Y.T.* (4)* (cf. Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1940.)

LABOR

October

20—A decree is issued authorizing commissariats to transfer engineers, technicians, skilled and office workers to other parts of the Soviet Union. All expenses and full interim salaries are guaranteed by this decree.—*N.Y.H.T.* (21)

MISCELLANEOUS

November

11—*Pravda* reports severe damage in Bessarabia and part of the Ukraine as a result of the earthquake in Rumania. —*PM* (11)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

EUROPE

September

3—A Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement is signed.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)

3—Authorized German sources issue the following statement: "There is no need for any kind of clarification of the German guaranty to Rumania, since Germany and the Soviet Union have been in constant contact and the Soviet Union is fully acquainted with the axis powers' plans." *N.Y.H.T.* (4)

5—Germany and the Soviet Union sign an agreement providing for the voluntary evacuation of persons of German nationality from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Germany.—*D.W.* (7)

7—TASS issues a denial of a Japanese report that Stalin and German Ambassador von Shulenberg had held talks on an agreement between the axis powers and the Soviet Union.—*D.W.* (8)

7—Rumania cedes Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

8—A Swedish-Soviet Trade Pact is signed providing for considerable increase in trade between the two countries over the last few years, with Sweden getting in particular oil products and grain in return for machine tools and wheels and other railway equipment. *N.Y.T.* (9)

10—The Bulgarian Minister to Moscow thanks Molotov for the "moral support" rendered by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria in the settlement of the Southern Dobruja question—*D.W.* (11)

10—A. Terentev is replaced as Soviet Ambassador to Turkey by M. Vinogradov.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

12—The German Ambassador in Moscow is advised that the Soviet Government cannot remain indifferent toward any arrangements that may be made in regulating shipping on the Danube. This statement was made following press announcements that a Conference is to be held in Vienna to modify the existing international status of the Danube.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

12—TASS issues a statement revealing that the Soviet Government has protested to the Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow against an incident on the new Soviet-Rumanian border in which the Rumanian troops opened fire on Soviet guards and shots were exchanged on both sides. Mr. Gafencu replied that his Government would investigate the matter.—*N.Y.H.T.*— (13)

12—It is reported from London that Great Britain has proposed to the USSR the cancellation of their respective claims and counter-claims arising out of the absorption of the Baltic States in the USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)

13—The Rumanian Government dispatches a note to Moscow in reply to the latter's protest that Rumanian planes had crossed the Soviet frontier and troops had opened fire on Soviet guards on the new Soviet Rumanian border in Northern Bukovina on August 29. The note arrived the same day that the Soviets protested against another such border incident.

A mixed boundary commission is established to investigate these incidents and to define the new borders.—*N.Y.T.* (14)

13—Nazi informants state that the German Government would take cognizance of the Soviet Union's demand to be included in the discussion of the status of the Danube River.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)

13—TASS dispatch brands as a fabrication a German and Rumanian newspaper item stating that it was Soviet Russia's intention to establish a protectorate over Rumania.—*N.Y.T.* (14)

14—A TASS dispatch states that the Rumanian Government has assured the Soviet Union of her desire to "preserve good neighborly relations with the USSR"—albeit denying Soviet charges of provoking border disturbances.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)

14—A report from Belgrade states that the official German news agency has declared that the International Danubian Commission no longer exists.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

15—TASS announces the conclusion of an agremeent between Finland and the Soviet Union providing for direct rail service between the two countries and for transit traffic between Sweden and the Soviet Union via Finland.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

16—It is reported from Berlin that oil shipments have reached Brest Litovsk from the Black Sea via the newly reopened Dnieper-Vistula-Bug Canal.—*N.Y.H.T.* (17)

18—Denmark and the Soviet Union conclude a trade agreement.—*D.W.* (20)

22—A report from the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U. S. Department of Agriculture, states that German imports of raw cotton have increased as a result of the trade arrangements between the USSR and Germany.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

24—TASS issues a denial of a Belgrade report that the Soviet Government had demanded that Turkey replace its Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoglu.—*D.W.* (25)

25—The Red Army newspaper, *Krasnaia Zvezda,* renounces an article printed September 21 by the paper to the effect that the Soviet Union is staying out of the conflict in the Balkans.—*Krasnaia Zvezda* (25)

October

1—The Soviet Union and Germany sign a railroad agreement providing for passenger and rail service between the two countries.—*N.Y.H.T.* (2)

3—It is announced from Helsinki that Finland and the Soviet Union have agreed on permanent demilitarization of the Aland Islands.—*N.Y.T.* (4)

5—Arrangements are made by the British Embassy and the Soviet Government for the removal of British citizens from the Baltic States.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)

10—TASS issues a denial of foreign press reports that the Soviet Government has presented demands to Germany that the former Polish regions now under German control be handed over to the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)

12—The Turkish Ambassador returns to Moscow after a two months' absence.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

14—A TASS dispatch denies that the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia are negotiating on the question of Germany's move into Rumania.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)

15—TASS issues a denial that the Soviet Government was informed in advance by Germany of the sending of Nazi troops into Rumania.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)

16—The British Ministry of Shipping requisitions ten Latvian and Estonian ships which the Soviets claim belong to them.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

16—It is reported from Berlin that authorized German sources insist that the Soviet Government was notified of German plans to march into Rumania.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)

16—A Soviet Legation spokesman in Bucharest states that the Soviets have a normal number of guards along the Soviet-Rumanian frontier, but do not have twelve divisions there, as reported abroad.—*N.Y.H.T.* (17)

17—It is announced that the demarcation of the Soviet-Finnish frontier is completed.—*Moscow News* (17)

18—TASS denies foreign reports that a Soviet destroyer had sunk a Rumanian ship in the Black Sea.—*N.Y.T.* (19)

18—TASS denies that Soviet troops had entered Rumania or that a clash had occurred between Soviet and German troops in Rumania.—*N.Y.T.* (19)

20—TASS denies foreign news reports that Stalin and the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Hadiar Aktay, had had a secret talk.—*N.Y.H.T.* (21)

22—Three shipping routes in the Baltic Sea from Leningrad are announced. They will extend to Tallinn, Riga, Libau and Koenigsberg; to Hangoe; and to Stockholm.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

24—The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs announces that the Soviet Union is joining Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania in a Danubian conference to be held in Bucharest.—*N.Y.T.* (25)

25—Soviet delegates to the Danube Conference in Bucharest state they will present a plan for making the uppermost branch of the Danube River as navigable as the lowest fork.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

25—The Yugoslavian Minister thanks Vice- Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky for the rescue of a Yugoslavian ship's crew by Soviet aviators and seamen after the vessel was shipwrecked in the Black Sea.—*Pravda* (29)

30—A German economic mission arrives in Moscow.—*N.Y.H.T.* (31)

31—TASS issues a denial of a British report that the Soviet Union has sent military airplanes to Greece.—*N.Y.T.* (Nov. 1)

November

2—The Soviet Government rejects a British protest on October 29 to the effect that Soviet participation with Germany, Italy and Rumania in the Danube Conference constitutes a violation of neutrality.—*N.Y.T.* (4)

6—The British Government reveals that it had seized two dozen ships flying the flags of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and that this matter is now the subject for diplomatic exchanges between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.—*N.Y.T.* (7)

8—It is reported from London that the Soviet Government does not make its semi-annual payment to the Lena Goldfields Company, Ltd.; this payment has been made in settlement of claims of this company for mining properties made in 1935 between the Soviet Government and the stockholders. It is suggested that the current payment is being held up in retaliation for the British seizure of gold and ships belonging to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.—*N.Y.T.* (9)

9—TASS announces that Molotov has accepted the invitation of the German Government to visit Berlin.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)

12—Hitler and Molotov hold talks in the Reichschancellory.—*P.M.* (12)

13—The Italian correspondent for the official *Stefani* news agency arrives in Moscow as press relations between Italy and the Soviet Union are re-established. A TASS bureau was

opened in Rome two months ago.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)

14—Nothing is revealed in the press of the nature of the talks between Molotov and Hitler, as Molotov leaves for home.—*P.M.* (14)

15—The British Foreign Office announces that it has offered not to be associated in an attack against the USSR; guarantees that the Soviets will participate in the peace settlement; and Britain will give *de facto* recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States. In return it asks "a more benevolent attitude" on the part of the USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

16—*Pravda* publishes the text of the German-Slovakia Treaty, signed in March, 1939, in which Germany assumed a protectorate over the segment of former Czechoslovakia.—*Pravda* (16)

18—A Soviet trade delegation arrives in Budapest, Hungary, reportedly to establish a permanent Soviet trade organization there.—*N.Y.T.* (19)

22—TASS issues a denial of a German report that Hungary joined the German-Italian-Japanese Alliance with the cooperation and approval of the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)

23—V. G. Dekanozov, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, is appointed Ambassador to Germany, replacing A. Shkvartsev.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)

25—It is announced in Berlin that Bulgaria is not being asked to join the Axis Pact and that Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia would constitute the second group of adherents.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

26—*Pravda* reports that relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union "are now established on a sound political basis."—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)

December

6—A Soviet-Slovakia trade agreement is signed in Moscow by which Slovakia will sell electrical equipment, copper cable and artificial silk in return for Soviet cotton and chemicals.—*N.Y.T.* (7)

10—A Bucharest newspaper reports that hundreds of Jewish families are emigrating from Rumania into Soviet Bessarabia.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)

12—A treaty of friendship is signed between Yugoslavia and Hungary.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

15—In a speech given at Glasgow, British Minister of Labor Bevin, in answer to alleged Communist hecklers, states that Britain "has to teach Russia that this method of carrying out her foreign policy does not pay in this country."—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)

16—Traffic is halted on the Yugoslavian section of the Danube due to drifting ice floes.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

17—The Soviet press urges Finland to maintain normal good neighborly relations with adjoining states and to prevent all adventures and experiments in foreign policy which might prove disastrous for Finland. This interest was apparently evoked by the forthcoming presidential elections in Finland.—*N.Y.H.T.*— (18)

19—Ex-President of Finland Kyosti Kallio dies.—*N.Y.T.* (20)

21—Risto Ryto is elected President of Finland. In his presidential address he pledges himself to improve relations between the Soviet Union, Germany and Sweden.—*N.Y.T.* (22)

25—It is reported that the Danube Conference has ended in failure to reach any decisions, although officially it is announced as being postponed until the end of January.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)

25—Reports from Budapest state that Soviet troops are being massed on the Rumanian border—as a counter move to a new German troop movement in the Balkans.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)

BALTIC AFFAIRS

September

2—It is announced that the Papal Nuncios in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are returning to the Vatican.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)

7—Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, who are Soviet citizens, and who are residing outside the borders of the Soviet Union are required by a decree of the Supreme Soviet to register with the Soviet embassy or consulates in the country of present residence.—*Pravda* (8)

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September

10—Yoshitsugu Tatekawa is named Japanese Ambassador to the USSR—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)

27—Germany, Italy and Japan conclude an alliance at Berlin of mutual assistance and establishing a "new order" in Europe and Asia. Article 5 of this agreement reads: "Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."—*PM* (27)

30—A *Pravda* editorial states that the pact of military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan "doubtless means further aggravation of the war and the expansion of its realm."—*N.Y.T.* (30)

October

14—On leaving Tokyo to take up his new post in Moscow, Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa makes the statement that the Soviets need the friendship of the Japanese Navy to insure getting shipments from the United States.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

18—The Burma Road is reopened.—*N.Y.T.*—(18)

18—TASS issues a denial of a Tokyo report that the Soviets are planning a conference between the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany and Italy.—*N.Y.T.* (19)

23—The Japanese Foreign Office notifies Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union that she is abrogating within a year an agreement for the protection of fur-bearing seals. This agreement, signed in 1911, called for the prohibition of killing or capturing of fur-bearing seals.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)

26—TASS denies a Japanese report that Tatekawa will confer with Stalin.—*Tass* (26)

28—Because of an epidemic of the plague in Manchuria, the Soviets announce strict quarantine regulations in the Far Eastern points of entry.—*Tass*(28)

November

15—TASS issues a denial that Japan and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement outlining spheres of influence in the Far East, including the cessation of Soviet aid to the Chungking Government.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

30—A treaty is signed between Japan and the Nanking Chinese Government headed by Wang Ching-wei.—*N.Y.T.* (30)

December

5—The Soviet Government informs Japan that her policy toward China remains unchanged in spite of Japan's recognition of the Nanking regime as the Chinese National Government.—*N.Y.T.* (6)

23—TASS issues a denial of a Shanghai story that war materials are being sent to China via Vladivostok.—*N.Y.T.* (24) (cf. *N.Y.T.* 22)

UNITED STATES AFFAIRS

September

5—The departure for the United States of the Latvian freighter Ciltvaira from Rio de Janeiro is again postponed,—as the ship's Latvian captain appeals a court decision to leave the ship and put her in command of a

Brazilian captain and crew.—*N.Y.T.* (6) (cf. *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union,* November, 1940. p. 117)

7—It is revealed that the United States State Department has closed its legations in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as requested by the Soviet Government. The representatives of these countries in the U. S. are still recognized.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

11—The Latvian ship, Ciltvaira, is granted a court order to sail with a cargo of manganese ore from Rio de Janeiro to the United States instead of to Murmansk as ordered by the Soviet Government after Latvia entered the USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (12)

12—American Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt returns to the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)

15—It is reported that a Swedish motorship brought $11,000,000 of Soviet gold bullion to this country to be applied against Soviet credits for purchases in the United States.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

October

7—Soviet Ambassador Oumansky confers with Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

12—It is reported from Washington that the United States has agreed to release the large part of a $10,000,000 Soviet order for machine tools and to permit the chartering of up to 100,000 tons of tankers to carry oil to Vladivostok.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)

15—In a press conference, President Roosevelt characterizes the Soviet Union as a "friendly power" when he announced that the Soviets would receive all their orders for machine tools and machinery except those items deemed vitally necessary by the U. S. Army and Navy experts.—*Daily News* (16)

15—Father Hubbard states that reports of Soviet fortifications on Big Diomede Island are untrue.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)

16—Soviet Ambassador Oumansky and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles hold another in the series of conversations going on during the last few months.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

23—Prospects of large scale purchases of cotton by the Soviet Union are talked about in Washington.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)

30—American military attaches in Moscow are invited to visit Red Army bases.—*N.Y.H.T.* (Nov. 1)

November

13—U. S. Under-Secretary of State states that he knows no reason why the talks between Molotov and Hitler should affect his conversations with Soviet Ambassador Oumansky.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)

22—The Soviet Government authorizes the United States to open a Consulate at Vladivostok.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)

22—The U. S. State Department states that discussions on the opening of a Consulate at Vladivostok have not yet reached the point where a definite announcement could be made.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

29—U. S. Under-Secretary of State Welles announces that arrangements have been made for the establishment of a U. S. Consulate at Vladivostok.—*N.Y.T.* (30)

December

3—On his return from a two months trip to Alaska, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, noted Arctic explorer, speaks for U. S. cooperation with the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.T.* (3)

9—Angus I. Ward, secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, is named acting-consul at the newly opened Vladivostok Consulate.—*N.Y.T.* (10)